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GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee Privacy

abstract. Threats to privacy abound in modern society, but individuals currently enjoy little

er
r

meaningful legal protection for their privacy interests. We argue that the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) offers a blueprint for preventing employers from breaching employee privacy. GINA has faced significant criticism since its enactment in 2008: commentators
have dismissed the law as ill-conceived, unnecessary, and ineffective. While we concede that GINA
may have failed to alleviate anxieties about medical genetic testing, we assert that it has unappreciated value as an employee-privacy statute. In the era of big data, protections for employee privacy
are more pressing than protections against genetic discrimination. Instead of failed legislation,
GINA could represent the future of employment law.
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4.

See There Will Be Little Privacy in the Workplace of the Future, ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2018)
[hereinafter There Will Be Little Privacy], https://www.economist.com/special-report
/2018/03/28/there-will-be-little-privacy-in-the-workplace-of-the-future [https://perma.cc
/343W-P69Y].
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Ben Chapman, More than Half of Employees Believe Their Boss Is Spying on Them at Work, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 17, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news
/workplace-surveillance-employees-boss-spying-on-workers-tuc-survey-a8495651.html
[https://perma.cc/KV6R-S3D4].
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Workers of the future may enjoy little to no privacy on the job. A recent article in the Economist describes Humanyze, a data-analytics firm that is using its
algorithmic approach to human resources on its own employees.1 Workers at
Humanyze wear identification badges that monitor their every move. The devices include microphones that pick up conversations, Bluetooth and infrared
sensors that track location, and an accelerometer that records movement.2 That
data is cross-referenced with employees’ calendars, emails, and other personal
information.3 The reports generated from this data include a surprisingly intimate amount of detail, including how much time an employee spends with
members of the same sex, her level of physical activity, and the amount of time
she spends speaking versus listening.4
The head of Humanyze sees these practices as smart business. He explains,
“[e]very aspect of business is becoming more data-driven. There’s no reason the
people side of business shouldn’t be the same.”5 However, employees may not
share that sentiment. One employee of the software firm Workday, which also
offers predictive data, quipped, “[t]his company knows much more about me
than my family does.”6 This sentiment is increasingly common among workers.
A recent study in the United Kingdom revealed that most respondents believed
that their bosses were spying on them, and two-thirds thought that the increasing amount of worker surveillance made possible by technology would lead to
distrust and discrimination.7
Stories like these give people more reason to be concerned with their privacy
than ever before. New technology, sometimes called “big data,” offers the opportunity to aggregate and cross-reference information to gain access to some of
our most intimate secrets, including our disease risks, our reproductive choices,
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Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
9. See FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that Reports Three Mutations
in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.fda
.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm599560.htm
[https://perma.cc
/ZNB9-UYDS].
10. Precision Medicine Initiative Working Grp., The Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program –
Building a Research Foundation for 21st Century Medicine, NAT’L INST. HEALTH 2 (Sept. 17, 2015),
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and information regarding our personal relationships. Employers might be particularly interested in snooping into their employees’ private lives. Data analytics
could reveal which employees are more likely to get sick, which employees are
more likely to take parental leave, and which employees are more likely to be
under stress at home. At present, the law offers few legal protections against this
kind of prying. We propose that the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA),8 an idiosyncratic federal antidiscrimination law, might provide an unexpected pathway for navigating the growing challenges presented by big data.
In this Feature, we argue that one decade after its passage, GINA, which
Congress intended primarily as a safeguard against discrimination based on genetic-test results, is better understood as a much-needed protection for employee privacy. In so arguing, we offer three novel contributions. First, we provide an empirical account of all the available cases decided under GINA.
Systematically examining all the cases and quantifying both the recurring factual
scenarios and the legal issues that have arisen in GINA’s first decade allows us to
say exactly what the statute is—and is not—accomplishing in the courts.
Second, we use that original case research to establish that in GINA’s first
ten years, there have been no successful claims filed for discrimination based on
genetic-test results. Instead, most of the successful cases under GINA have involved impermissible requests for protected data. GINA, in practical terms, has
functioned more as a protection against invasions of privacy than as a protection
against discrimination.
While GINA’s role as a privacy law is unexpected, it could hardly be better
timed. The genetic-testing market has ballooned in recent years because of the
FDA’s increasing openness to genetic tests that allow consumers to screen their
genes for disease risk from the convenience of their own homes. For example, in
2018 the FDA approved the first direct-to-consumer DNA test for three
BRCA1/BRCA2 genetic mutations, each of which sharply increases the risk of
breast cancer.9 Meanwhile, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) aims to enroll a million people by 2019 in its Precision Medicine Initiative,10 a research effort intended to tailor the delivery of health care to a patient’s specific genetic

714

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3214163

iew
ed

gina, big data, and the future of employee privacy

i. gina in theory
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makeup and disease profile.11 And private DNA ancestry databases made headlines in 2018, when law enforcement used that technology to solve a string of
decades-old murders.12 Careful thinking about genetic privacy is now more critical than ever.
Third, we argue that GINA’s role as a privacy statute highlights the need for
greater employee-privacy measures in general. In particular, GINA’s statutory
design might well function as a blueprint for additional employment protections. GINA provides an important case study for safeguarding sensitive employee information that could be extended to a whole host of other areas, such
as social media profiles, browser searches, and fitness-tracking data.
We tell the story of GINA in three acts. Part I introduces the statute and explains what legislators designed GINA to accomplish. Part II examines the first
decade of GINA. We begin with our case-study findings. Next, we turn to the
common misreading of GINA as a failure based on its performance in the courts.
We argue that the cases decided and settlements reached reveal that GINA is
hitting its stride as a privacy statute. Finally, Part III argues that genetic privacy—
and privacy in ancillary fields—is more important than ever before and that
GINA is precisely the kind of protection we need in an age of big data and increasingly invasive technologies. Moreover, GINA provides a conceptual blueprint for protecting employees from discrimination in a variety of other areas.
GINA’s first ten years reveal that it may be a prototype for future antidiscrimination laws.

ot

Congress did not design GINA as a broad employee-privacy statute. Rather,
it intended to prophylactically address fears about genetic testing by stopping a
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https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-working
-group-report-20150917-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZHQ-5BE8].
11. See Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative, WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 30, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30
/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative
[https://perma.cc/R3TC
-LQ JH].
12. See Abigail Abrams, How Did They Catch the Golden State Killer? An Online DNA Service and
His Genetic Relatives Revealed the Suspect, TIME (Apr. 26, 2018), http://time.com/5256835
/how-did-golden-state-killer-genealogy-websites-online-dna-police
[https://perma.cc
/9AE9-DMPK]; Jessica L. Roberts, Opinion, A Houston DNA Company Helped Catch the
Golden State Killer. What Does It Mean for Your Privacy?, HOUS. CHRON. (May 17, 2018),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/A-Houston-DNA-company
-helped-catch-the-Golden-12920214.php [https://perma.cc/H3AW-9NZK].
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new form of discrimination before it started.13 Discrimination based on genetic
information was not a widespread social problem when Congress passed GINA.
But supporters hoped that GINA might encourage genetic testing by giving people peace of mind about their genetic information. Indeed, Congress crafted the
law to deal with the specific risks related to health insurance and employment
that could discourage people from seeking genetic testing altogether. This Part
introduces GINA’s statutory protections and places it in its historical context,
explaining why Congress opted to pass an antidiscrimination statute absent a
longstanding history of discrimination.

ev

A. A Brief Introduction to GINA
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Hailed as the first civil rights law of the twenty-first century, GINA protects
against discrimination on the basis of genetic information. Congress designed
the statute to alleviate people’s anxieties about genetic testing by prohibiting
health insurers and employers from using genetic-test results and family medical
history to discriminate. In this Section, we outline the contours of GINA’s protections, discussing the statute’s structure and its definitions of genetic information and discrimination.
The statute has two substantive titles. Title I contains the health-insurance
provisions, which prevent insurers from requesting genetic information and
from using that information in their underwriting and rating decisions. Title I
amends several federal health-insurance statutes to close any gaps in those
laws.14 Because GINA draws from existing legislation, it has no independent enforcement mechanisms for its health-insurance sections. Instead, it relies on the
enforcement mechanisms of those underlying laws, most of which have no private right of action.15 But Title II, which contains GINA’s employment provi-

See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 470-71 (2010) (discussing legislative history that
demonstrates Congress’s intent to address genetic-information discrimination even while acknowledging it was not yet occurring widely).
14. See id. at 452 (explaining that Title I, like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA), amends preexisting insurance legislation); id. at 443-44 (identifying
gaps in HIPAA’s coverage that Title I would later address).
15. See Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., “GINA”: The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008: Information for Researchers and Health Care Professionals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES (Apr. 6, 2009), https://www.genome.gov/pages/policyethics
/geneticdiscrimination/ginainfodoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ALZ-F6RY] (discussing the enforcement of Title I of GINA by various agencies whose laws were amended by the statute,
including the Department of Labor, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Health
and Human Services).
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18.
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19.

Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 207, 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-6 (2018).
Id. § 201(4)(A)(i)-(iii).
29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a)(2) (2018). The statute defines each of these relational degrees:
(i) First-degree relatives include an individual’s parents, siblings, and children.
(ii) Second-degree relatives include an individual’s grandparents, grandchildren,
uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, and half-siblings. (iii) Third-degree relatives include an individual’s great-grandparents, great-grandchildren, great uncles/aunts,
and first cousins. (iv) Fourth-degree relatives include an individual’s great-greatgrandparents, great-great-grandchildren, and first cousins once-removed (i.e., the
children of the individual’s first cousins).
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 36 (2007).
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 201(4)(C).
Id.
Id. § 210.
Id. § 201(2)(B).
See H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 3, at 69-71.
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sions, is its own standalone portion of the federal code with an independent private right of action.16
GINA defines statutorily protected genetic information as (1) a person’s genetic tests, (2) the genetic tests of her family members, and (3) manifested conditions in her family members.17 Pursuant to GINA’s Title II regulations, a person’s family members are her dependents, regardless of whether through birth,
marriage, or adoption, as well as her first, second, third, and fourth degree relatives.18 Congress included family medical history in the definition of genetic information because it understood that employers could use family medical history
“as a surrogate for genetic traits.”19 The statute specifically excludes any information about sex,20 age,21 or an individual’s own health conditions22 from its
definition of genetic information. Finally, Title II of GINA prohibits employers
and other employment-related entities like unions, agencies, and training programs from discriminating on the basis of genetic information. Instead of defining employer, GINA adopts the definitions of employer found in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the Government Employee Rights Act, and the Congressional
Accountability Act.23
Importantly, GINA’s text includes no element of genetic risk. In other words,
nothing in the definition of genetic information requires the covered data to
speak to a person’s propensity for developing a particular health condition. Indeed, as GINA was being debated, some legislators lamented that the definition
of genetic information was too broad and argued it should cover only predictive
information.24 Still, the language of the bill was not amended, leaving GINA

20.
21.

22.
23.
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with “sweeping breadth.”25 Thus, on its face, GINA would appear to cover all
genetic-test results—including DNA forensics26 and DNA ancestry tests27—as
well as all manifested conditions in family members, regardless of whether those
conditions are genetic in nature. In addition to its more traditional antidiscrimination protections, GINA’s health-insurance and employment provisions both
prohibit requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. Hence, to violate GINA, a health insurer or employer need not even receive—let alone act
on—genetic information. The covered entity merely needs to ask. In this way,
GINA uses privacy as a bulwark, preventing access to the very information health
insurers or employers could use to discriminate.28
B. GINA’s Purpose

1. Background Information

er
r

While outlawing conduct that is not yet occurring may seem like a waste of
legislative energy, Congress was responding to a unique set of social and historical factors when it passed GINA. The statute was, in fact, a long time coming.
In this Section, we provide the historical background for GINA, outline Congress’s intent, and take a deeper dive into the statute’s protections.

Id. at 66 (complaining that Title II failed to take a cue from the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the
“numerous exclusions for use and disclosure” in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).
26. See, e.g., Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1364
(N.D. Ga. 2015) (finding that employer-conducted genetic testing for investigative purposes
violates GINA).
27. See Trina Jones et al., DNA-Based Race? 47-53 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
28. See Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 710 (2012)
(arguing that antidiscrimination principles are natural allies to privacy); Jessica L. Roberts,
Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2099-2103 (2015)
(arguing that privacy law can do the work of antidiscrimination law, and vice versa).
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Fully understanding GINA requires knowing about both the genetic-testing
industry and the American health-insurance system. We begin with a brief introduction to genetic science before turning to the characteristics of the healthinsurance industry that prompted Congress to act.

718

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3214163

a. Rise of Genetic Information

iew
ed

gina, big data, and the future of employee privacy

31.

pe

rin

32.

ot

30.

See Francis S. Collins, Shattuck Lecture—Medical and Societal Consequences of the Human Genome Project, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 28, 34 (1999); Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information
and the Workplace: Legislative Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 1755, 1756 (1997)
(providing a discussion of federal legislation related to genetic information resulting from the
efforts of the Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the Human Genome Research).
See Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 174 (“When the
Human Genome Project officially began in 1990, the potential for genetic discrimination in
health insurance was the first issue to receive the attention of scholars, policy analysts, and
state legislatures.”).
See Roberts, supra note 13, at 446 n.27 (citing Genetics and Health Insurance State Anti-Discrimination Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/research
/health/genetic-nondiscrimination-in-health-insurance-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/QM2K
-ZQTY]).
See, e.g., William S. Bush & Jason H. Moore, Chapter 11: Genome-Wide Association Studies,
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIO., Dec. 2012, at 1 (“The ultimate goal of GWAS is to use genetic
risk factors to make predictions about who is at risk and to identify the biological underpinnings of disease susceptibility for developing new prevention and treatment strategies.”).
The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (July 6, 2016),
https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-human-genome
[https://
perma.cc/LU3P-LGDK].
Id.; see also Abigail Fagan, From 13 Years to 20 Hours, Genome Sequencing Breaks Record, GENOME
MAG. (Mar. 1, 2018), http://genomemag.com/2018/03/from-13-years-to-20-hours-genome
-sequencing-breaks-record [https://perma.cc/7BNC-BS6Q].
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Members of Congress began introducing prophylactic genetic legislation in
the early 1990s, around the time that scientists started sequencing the human
genome.29 The possibility that genetic information could jeopardize healthinsurance coverage was on everyone’s minds.30 By the time GINA passed in
2008, almost every state had some kind of protection already on the books.31 The
motivation for these laws, as well as for GINA, was not so much actual discrimination or invasions of privacy, but hypothetical ones.
Although genetic science has a variety of uses, first and foremost it predicts
disease risk.32 Genetic tests can tell people whether they have a heightened proclivity for a host of hereditary conditions, from Alzheimer’s to Zellweger Syndrome. At the beginning of the genetic revolution, the technologies available to
sequence genetic data were expensive and time-consuming. The Human Genome Project, in fact, took thirteen years to fully sequence a single human genome, at a cost of somewhere between five hundred million and one billion dollars.33 Today, a high-quality whole-genome sequence can be generated for
around a thousand dollars and in as little as twenty hours.34
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36.

Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Real Cost of the US Health Care System, 319 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 983, 983
(2018).
Vernon K. Smith et al., Implementing Coverage and Payment Initiatives: Results from a 50-State
Medicaid Budget Survey for Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 10 (Oct.
2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Implementing-Coverage-and-Payment
-Initiatives [https://perma.cc/Q5GG-4SB3].
Who Is Eligible for Medicare?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Sept. 11, 2014), https://
www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/who-is-elibible-for-medicare/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S4U7-28XP].
See 25 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018) (Native Americans); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2018) (disabled people); 42
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV) (2018) (low-income families); 38 C.F.R. § 17.38 (2017) (veterans).
T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER, AND FAIRER
HEALTH CARE 20-21 (2009); cf. JESSICA C. BARNETT & MARINA S. VORNOVITSKY, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 1-3 (2016),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-257
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR7W-JWFA]. Even under the Affordable Care Act, the government
has assembled private insurance companies to create health-insurance marketplaces that, in
their ideal formulation, allow Americans to “one-stop shop for a health care plan, compare
benefits and prices, and choose the plan that’s best for them.” Barack Obama, Letter to Senate
Democratic Leaders on Health Care Reform (June 2, 2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/content
/pkg/DCPD-200900432/pdf/DCPD-200900432.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3UD-3H9N].
See BARNETT & VORNOVITSKY, supra note 39, at 1.
See id.
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American health care is some of the most expensive in the world,35 and necessary medical treatment may be prohibitively expensive absent health-insurance coverage. Thus, access to meaningful health insurance is often a proxy for
access to health care. For some patients, losing health-insurance coverage can be
a death sentence.
Complicating things further, the United States does not have a uniform
health-insurance system. Instead, it has a patchwork of public and private options that rely on various qualifying criteria. For example, the government covers
its citizens at the beginning and the end of life: Medicaid covers almost half of
all births each year,36 and Medicare provides coverage for the elderly.37 Other
populations that enjoy government-sponsored health benefits include veterans,
people with disabilities, Native Americans, and low-income individuals.38
Everyone else must obtain their health-insurance policies from private companies.39 Most working-age Americans with health insurance have employer-provided plans.40 The rest can purchase health insurance on the individual market.41
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Private health insurance in the United States is primarily for-profit. To make
money, an insurance company must accurately assess risk to ensure that it is
earning more in premiums than it is paying out in claims. Before Congress
passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, private insurance companies had
significantly more leeway regarding which policies they offered to whom and at
what price. American health insurance, in other words, depended on risk rating.
Particularly in the pre-ACA individual market, if a person seemed to be a
“bad risk,” obtaining health insurance could be next to impossible. Consider the
following hypothetical. A person with a cancer diagnosis wishes to purchase
health insurance on the pre-ACA individual market. Given the high likelihood
that she would require expensive treatment and drain the company coffers, a
private, for-profit health insurer could have done a few different things. First, it
could have offered her a policy but not covered her cancer expenses. This tactic
is known as a “preexisting condition exclusion.”42 Second, the insurer could have
capped the coverage it was willing to pay for the cancer treatment, either annually or over the lifetime of the policy. For example, it might have covered the first
ten thousand dollars, but after that, the patient would have had to pay out of
pocket. Third, the insurer could have offered the person a policy that provides
comprehensive coverage for cancer but priced it at a very high rate. Such a policy
would reflect the actual cost of cancer treatment, making it extremely expensive—so expensive that it might be unaffordable. Finally, if the chances of turning a profit were remote enough, the insurer might have deemed the person not
worth insuring and refused to offer her a plan at all.
People on employer-provided plans also faced their own set of challenges
before the ACA. Even now, linking health insurance to employment means that
losing a job can also mean losing health insurance. Fears of giving up benefits
and being left uninsured can lead people to stay in their current positions, a phenomenon known as “job lock.”43 Also, the employer-provided system may encourage employers, particularly those offering small-group insurance, to employ
only “good risks” to avoid hiking up their premiums or having to make big payouts. Congress attempted to regulate what employers could do as de facto providers of health insurance through statutes like the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Health Insurance Portability and

DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE 226 (David E. Marcinko ed., 2006).
43. Dean Baker, Job Lock and Employer-Provided Health Insurance: Evidence from the Literature,
AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 1 (Mar. 2015), https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015-03
/JobLock-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XSU-R8ZT].
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Accountability Act (HIPAA).44 However, pre-GINA and pre-ACA, those laws
still left employees vulnerable.45
2. Congress’s Intent in Passing GINA
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Given the state of the American health-insurance system in the 1990s and
early 2000s, fears of losing health insurance were justified. Discovering previously unknown health risks can make health care more difficult to access. Especially before the ACA, a quantifiable medical risk could mean higher premiums
or losing coverage altogether. In the pre-GINA, pre-ACA era, health insurers
could request genetic testing and engage in much more risk rating.46 Against this
backdrop, the combination of predictive genetics and private, for-profit health
insurance created an ironic twist for medical genetic testing. If a person were
tested and learned she was at a heightened risk, she might find herself uninsurable and therefore unable to access treatment, including treatment for the very
condition that prompted her to take the genetic test in the first place. For example, a woman with a family medical history of breast cancer might seek BRCA1
testing. If her test revealed a genetic predisposition for breast cancer, her insurer
might want to drop her. Losing coverage could jeopardize her ability to access
care, either preventatively or if the cancer manifested. This fear was well understood; GINA’s legislative history included stories of employees who tested positive for heightened genetic risk and were then asked to switch insurance policies
to save their employers money.47 It is no wonder then that people hesitated to
take genetic tests. Learning of a medical risk could put them, as well as their
family members, at risk of losing access to health care.
This rational decision on the part of consumers was bad news for the genetictesting industry. Investors banked on the belief that once the tests became faster
See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to interfere with rights provided to an employee by an employee benefit plan); see also Baker, supra note 43, at 8 (describing the implementation of HIPAA as a way to minimize job lock).
45. For example, while HIPAA outlawed charging an individual group member more for a premium, it did not prevent hiking the premium rate for the group as a whole. See Roberts, supra
note 13, at 443; Dale Halsey Lea, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA): What
It Means for Your Patients and Families, 14 ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING (May 5, 2009),
http://ojin.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals
/OJIN/TableofContents/Vol142009/No2May09/Articles-Previous-Topics/The-Genetic
-Information-Nondiscrimination-Act-GINA.html [https://perma.cc/N8R2-RH6T].
46. Although HIPAA prohibits the use of genetic information in decisions about eligibility or premiums, it does not prohibit requesting or requiring genetic information, nor does it apply to
the individual health-insurance market. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 443-44.
47. See id. at 466-67.
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and more affordable, they would enjoy a significant market.48 But when the science improved and the projected increase did not occur, stakeholders wanted to
know why.49 Not surprisingly, survey data reported that people were uncomfortable with genetic tests for a variety of reasons, especially because of concerns
about employment discrimination and losing health insurance.50
In passing GINA, Congress attempted to respond to this catch-22 by ensuring that a heightened genetic risk would not mean losing a job or health insurance. That reassurance might then encourage people to participate in medical
genetic testing. If there is any doubt that Congress designed GINA to alleviate
public concerns about taking medical genetic tests, lawmakers spoke their subtext. The last line of GINA’s congressional findings reads: “Federal legislation
establishing a national and uniform basic standard is necessary to fully protect
the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the potential for
discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic-testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.”51 GINA thus represents a very
specific response to a very specific problem.
Putting GINA in its social and historical context reveals that while the statute
appears to be simple, straightforward antidiscrimination legislation, its purpose
differs significantly from traditional civil rights legislation. Whereas those laws
addressed existing social problems, GINA responded to anxieties about future
social problems. Thus, the paradigmatic GINA claim seems to target a health

See Rothstein, supra note 30, at 175 (“In addition, genetics researchers, biotech companies,
pharmaceutical companies, and genetic test developers realize that their efforts will be for
naught unless individuals are willing to undergo genetic testing. Thus, researchers and commercial interests have been among the staunchest supporters of genetic nondiscrimination
legislation.”).
49. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 13, at 471-73 (describing people’s unwillingness to participate in
research or to take genetic tests).
50. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Patients’ Fear of Genetic Discrimination by Health Insurers:
The Impact of Legal Protections, 2 GENETICS MED. 214, 216 tbl.1 (2000) (showing that sixtyseven percent of genetic counselors reported that patients had a high level of concern about
genetic discrimination regarding adult-onset conditions when deciding to be tested); Rothstein, supra note 30, at 175 (“There is considerable evidence that numerous individuals who
are genetically at-risk for some serious disorders decline potentially efficacious genetic testing
and medical intervention because they are concerned about the possibility of discrimination
against themselves and family members.”); see also Laura M. Amendola et al., Why Patients
Decline Genomic Sequencing Studies: Experiences from the CSER Consortium, 2018 J. GENETIC
COUNSELING 1220, 1225 (reporting that thirteen percent of patients declined genetic testing
because of privacy and discrimination concerns).
51. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2, 122 Stat. 881,
882-83.
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insurer that either drops coverage or hikes up premiums based on a genetic test
that reveals a previously unknown health risk.
GINA’s other protections appear to grow out of this core concern. GINA covers employment because of its connection to health insurance. And because we
share so much genetic information with our family members—a reality thrown
into sharp relief when authorities recently apprehended a killer based on the genetic data of a family member52—individuals reasonably fear that their genetictest results could harm their loved ones. Pre-GINA, people reported avoiding
genetic tests not because of anxieties surrounding their own health risks, but out
of concerns for their families. In particular, they worried that their genetic-test
results could cause their children to lose health-insurance coverage.53 GINA,
therefore, covers the genetic test results of family members. Congress also included family medical history—albeit not one’s own manifested conditions—because it is hard to distinguish meaningfully between getting fired because your
sister carries the BRCA1 gene and getting fired because your sister has breast
cancer. Lastly, the privacy protection bolsters the antidiscrimination protection.
After all, a person cannot lose her policy based on information that the insurer
cannot access.
3. GINA’s Idiosyncratic Protections

pe

Considering Congress’s intent, GINA’s seemingly peculiar protections make
sense. Four things make GINA different from other familiar federal antidiscrimination statutes: (a) its limited scope; (b) its narrow protected status; (c) its
prohibited conduct; and (d) its broad exceptions.

ot

a. Limited Scope

52.

tn

Compared to other civil rights laws, which tend to cover discrimination
across a wide swath of contexts, GINA is relatively limited in scope.54 For example, the Civil Rights Act has titles that pertain to voting, public accommodations,
See Roberts, supra note 12.
See Roberts, supra note 13, at 472 & n.168; see also Rothstein, supra note 30, at 175 (“There is
considerable evidence that numerous individuals who are genetically at-risk for some serious
disorders decline potentially efficacious genetic testing and medical intervention because they
are concerned about the possibility of discrimination against themselves and family members.”).
54. But see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b),
81 Stat. 602, 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2018)) (describing the ADEA’s
purpose as the protection of older persons in employment).
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b. Narrow Protected Status
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government services, education, federal funding, and employment.55 Likewise,
the ADA has titles governing employment, government services, and public accommodations.56 By contrast, GINA applies only to health insurance and employment. GINA’s employment title provides that discrimination in health insurance, even discrimination that violates Title I, cannot be the foundation for a
Title II claim.57
From a practical perspective, GINA’s limited coverage means that a significant portion of genetic-privacy invasions and discrimination goes unregulated.
In most states, for example, it is perfectly legal for banks, landlords, schools, and
even life insurers to make decisions based on genetic information.58 However,
given GINA’s very specific goal of encouraging more people to take medical genetic tests, Congress’s decision to limit the statute’s scope to health insurance
and employment was sensible. Health insurance and employment were the areas
of greatest concern, and more expansive legislation would not have received adequate congressional support.

57.
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58.

ot

56.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000f (2018)).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (2018)).
Roberts, supra note 13, at 450 (explaining that GINA includes a “firewall” provision, which
prohibits claimants from suing under both the employment and health-insurance provisions
to obtain separate remedies, to allay fears that employers providing insurance would get sued
twice).
California, which passed its own comprehensive state legislation called CalGINA, is the notable exception. See CalGINA, ch. 261, 2011 Cal. Stat. 2774 (codified in scattered sections of the
California Codes). CalGINA covers the use of genetic information in health insurance, employment, housing, restrictive covenants, emergency medical care and services, and financial
institutions and amended the Education Code to provide schools more information needed
to help combat genetic-information bias. Id.
For example, courts have construed Title VII to apply to all races and sexes. Similarly, after
the Amendments Act, the ADA has an intentionally broad construction. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(1) (“The purposes of this Act are to carry out the ADA’s objectives of providing ‘a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination’ and ‘clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination’ by reinstating a broad
scope of protection to be available under the ADA.”).
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GINA protects against very limited forms of discrimination, whereas other
federal antidiscrimination laws contain broader protections.59 At present GINA
only proscribes intentional discrimination. In fact, GINA explicitly excludes em-
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Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-7(a) (2018).
The text expressly provides that there is no cause of action for unintentional practices that
may have a disparate impact on the basis of genetic information. Id. (“Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, ‘disparate impact’, as that term is used in section 703(k) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . , on the basis of genetic information does not establish a cause of
action under this Act.”).
See Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination
Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 639-40 (2011).
Id. at 640.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 208(b). The Act provides:
On the date that is 6 years after the date of enactment of this Act, there shall be
established a commission, to be known as the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study
Commission (referred to in this section as the ‘Commission’) to review the developing science of genetics and to make recommendations to Congress regarding
whether to provide a disparate impact cause of action under this Act.
Id.
See Roberts, supra note 61, at 639.
See id.
See, e.g., id. at 638-39.
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ployment discrimination actions for disparate impact.60 Disparate impact actions
cover claims for discrimination by effect, not by design. For example, genes associated with height may also carry with them an increased risk of heart disease.
Thus, a height requirement could also have a disparate impact on the basis of
genetic information.61 Because GINA covers only explicit discrimination, employers could even attempt to use the lack of disparate impact coverage as an
end-run around the statute, adopting policies designed to screen out people with
certain genetic attributes.62 Congress included a provision establishing a commission that would assemble six years from GINA’s enactment to assess the potential need for a disparate impact protection.63 However, as of this writing, that
commission has not convened.
GINA also fails to require positive differential treatment, such as accommodations.64 Genetic accommodations could allow employees to mitigate their genetic risk. For instance, an employer might accommodate an employee with a
genetic proclivity for carpal tunnel syndrome by having that employee work a
longer shift but with more breaks.65 Commentators, including one of the authors
of this Feature, have proposed that GINA could benefit tremendously from allowing employers to account for genetic difference.66
Finally, while all people are potential beneficiaries of GINA because we all
have genetic information, the law’s actual coverage is quite narrow. As noted, the
legal definition of genetic information excludes sex, age, and manifested condi-

64.
65.
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tions.67 These omissions would confound any geneticist or genetic counselor
who knows that chromosomes determine biological sex, that the telomeres protecting our genetic data shorten as we age, and that the line between a genetic
predisposition and a diagnosed condition can be hazy. Yet age, sex, and manifested conditions are all relevant to the risk rating traditionally at the heart of the
health-insurance industry.68 Further, employees already enjoyed antidiscrimination protection for these attributes in the form of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the ADA. Again, GINA’s modesty reflects its purpose. Congress designed the law to provide just enough protection to encourage
people to undergo genetic testing for disease risk, not to create a robust, new
antidiscrimination regime.
c. Prohibited Conduct

See supra notes 20-22.
68. For example, Mark Rothstein observes that “GINA does not prohibit discrimination based on
an individual’s own health history because such a provision would prohibit health insurers
from using health status in underwriting.” Mark A. Rothstein, GINA at Ten and the Future of
Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 3, 5 (2018).
69. Daniel Wiessner, Georgia Workers Win $2.2 Million in ‘Devious Defecator’ Case, REUTERS (June
23, 2015, 11:56 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-verdict-dna-defecator/Georgia
-workers-win-2-2-million-in-devious-defecator-case-idUSKBN0P31TP20150623 [https://
perma.cc/9AW2-7MMW].
70. Roberts, supra note 13, at 451-52.
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GINA also departs from traditional antidiscrimination legislation in the type
of conduct it prohibits. It forbids not only discriminatory treatment, but also
inquiries related to protected status. This novel form of protection has generated
confusion about the remedies available under GINA’s employment private right
of action. What damages are appropriate when an employer seeks genetic information but fails to take a corresponding adverse employment action? As discussed at greater length in Part II, at least one jury thought 2.2 million dollars
was a fair amount.69 GINA seeks to make individuals more comfortable with
genetic testing not only by protecting against discrimination, but also by safeguarding privacy.
GINA also adopts a relatively comprehensive definition of what it means to
discriminate. The insurance title forbids using genetic information to determine
coverage, eligibility, or premiums; obtaining genetic information for underwriting purposes; and treating genetic information as a preexisting condition.70 The
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employment title prohibits hiring, firing, classifying, or otherwise disadvantaging employees on the basis of genetic information.71
d. Broad Exceptions

72.
73.

rin

74.

Id. at 452.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)
(2018).
H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 37-38 (2007); Regulations Under the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 68912, 68919 (Nov. 9, 2010) (codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1635) (“Congress did not want casual conversation among co-workers regarding
health to trigger federal litigation whenever someone mentioned something that might constitute protected family medical history.”).
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 202(b)(1) (excepting an employer who “inadvertently requests or requires family medical history”); id. § 202(c) (requiring that even if
genetic information is obtained through an exception, it “may not be used in violation of
[GINA’s discrimination provisions] or treated or disclosed in a manner that violates [GINA’s
confidentiality provisions]”).
See id. § 202(b) (insulating voluntary wellness programs that request genetic information or
family medical history).
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GINA’s employment provision offers six exceptions for legally obtaining genetic information. GINA permits an employer to obtain genetic information under a variety of conditions, including (1) inadvertently; (2) through voluntary
wellness programs; (3) when processing medical leave; (4) via commercially
available documents, like newspapers that contain obituaries; (5) for the occupational monitoring of toxic substances; and (6) to ensure quality control of
DNA analysis in law enforcement.72
Employees may inadvertently share genetic information with their coworkers, an issue GINA’s supporters termed the “water cooler problem.”73 For example, if a person tells her boss that her sister was diagnosed with breast cancer, she
has just shared statutorily protected genetic information with her employer.
Foreseeing this issue, GINA’s architects included an exception for inadvertently
acquiring genetic information, as long as the employer safeguards it and does
not use it to discriminate.74
As noted, GINA includes an exception to its rule against requests for genetic
information if employees participate in voluntary wellness programs.75 While
the distinction between mandatory and voluntary wellness programs may seem
straightforward, what constitutes a “voluntary” program has been the subject of
litigation. The salient question is whether employers may offer a financial in-
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Courts, however, have avoided deciding the issue. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131
F. Supp. 3d 849 (W.D. Wis. 2015); EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., 145 F. Supp. 3d 841 (E.D. Wis.
2015).
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31143, 31158 (May 17, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2018)). But see Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker
Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 768 (2017) (observing that while the EEOC’s regulations
define a voluntary wellness program as one which does not “penalize” employees for declining
participation, they fail to take a position on what would constitute a penalty).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iii) (“No inducement may be offered, however, in return for the
spouse’s providing his or her own genetic information, including results of his or her genetic
tests, or for information about the manifestation of disease or disorder in an employee’s children, including adult children.”).
Id. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iv) (mandating that a covered entity may not provide any inducement “in
exchange for an agreement permitting the sale, exchange, sharing, transfer, or other disclosure
of genetic information”).
AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 37 (D.D.C. 2017), amended by 292 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D.D.C.
2017) (staying the effective date of the vacatur order until January 1, 2019).
See, e.g., Statement by AARP EVP Nancy LeaMond on EEOC Workplace Wellness Program Rules,
AARP (May 16, 2016), https://press.aarp.org/2016-05-16-Statement-by-AARP-EVP-Nancy
-LeaMond-on-EEOC-Workplace-Wellness-Program-Rules
[https://perma.cc/2MAV
-DHLA] [hereinafter LeaMond Statement] (noting that older workers “are more likely to have
the very types of less visible medical conditions and disabilities . . . that are at risk of disclosure
by wellness questionnaires and exams”).
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ducement to participate—and if so, how much of an incentive—and still ensure
that participation is voluntary.76
In 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) weighed
in on this debate. It promulgated regulations clarifying that an employer may
indeed offer an incentive for the employee or her spouse to participate in a wellness program that involves sharing medical data as long as the inducement does
not exceed thirty percent of the cost of coverage under the plan.77 An employer
may not, however, offer the employee an incentive in exchange for her spouse’s
or children’s genetic information.78 Similarly, the employer may not provide any
inducement to the employee or spouse to agree to the sale, exchange, or disclosure of genetic information.79
However, in late 2017, a federal district court vacated these regulations as of
January 1, 2019, finding that the EEOC “failed to adequately explain its decision
to construe the term ‘voluntary’ in the ADA and GINA to permit the 30% incentive level [that was] adopted.”80 The EEOC is now in the process of revising
these regulations. Wellness programs are likely to continue to be scrutinized and
face legal challenges since they disproportionately affect mobilized constituencies such as older workers, people with disabilities, and women.81
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A. GINA’s First Ten Years
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Despite GINA’s lengthy legislative history and novel protections, the statute
arrived with more of a fizzle than a bang. In Part II, we catalog all available GINA
cases and consider how GINA has performed in the courts. Although Congress
drafted the law primarily as a protection against discrimination based on genetic-test results, remarkably there have been no such claims in the entirety of
GINA’s first ten years.
This Part then turns to GINA’s largely chilly reception as a piece of antidiscrimination legislation and outlines why many commentators labeled the statute
a failure from the very start. Criticized for being ineffective, unnecessary, and
irrelevant, the law might seem like a disappointment so far. While we do not
challenge the predominant view that GINA has not delivered on its original
aims, our case research suggests that—despite popular opinion—GINA has had
significant, albeit unforeseen, benefits. Upon closer inspection, the cases reveal
that GINA is enjoying a second life as an unexpected protection for employee
privacy.
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pe

Some data sets involve thousands of cases. At other times the bounded nature of the inquiry or the newness of a law will result in a smaller set of cases.82
For our case study, we reviewed all the published and unpublished federal decisions in which courts considered a GINA claim, spanning from November 2009,
the month in which GINA’s employment provisions became effective, until June
2018.83 Of those 184 cases, we found seventy-seven orders that involved plausible
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1749, 1767 (1990) (analyzing fifty-four employment discrimination cases in which a
lower federal court addressed the argument that sex segregation is a reflection of women’s
lack of interest in certain types of jobs); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV.
95, 116-17 (2010) (comparing fifty-nine cases decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to sixty-five cases decided after, in order
to determine the case’s impact on motions to dismiss in the disability discrimination context).
83. The 184 decisions were compiled in the following way: We first identified our complete set of
cases through searching “‘Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act’ or ‘Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act’” in the federal court databases on both Westlaw and Lexis.
We restricted the date range to November 21, 2009—the date GINA’s Title II employment
provisions became effective—through June 17, 2018. For Westlaw, this yielded 253 cases and
for Lexis, this yielded 278 cases. Notably, both Westlaw and Lexis had unique cases that the
other database did not have, so that our total universe of unique cases across the two databases
was 288 cases. After eliminating from the set of 288 those cases that only mentioned GINA,
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but did not involve an actual claim under the statute, we were left with a pool of 184 published
and unpublished decisions.
Here, we largely sought to eliminate cases in which a plaintiff simply filed under the statute
even though the facts did not begin to suggest a GINA claim. The typical case we cut at this
point might involve a plaintiff who claimed race or sex discrimination at the EEOC, but then
who showed up at the district court suing under every federal antidiscrimination statute. In
approximately sixty percent of the 184 cases in which there was a GINA claim, the Plaintiffs
did not plead any facts that could conceivably support such a claim.
These cases are noted in the Appendix. The forty-eight figure represents a subset of the 184
cases reviewed for this Feature. See supra note 83 and accompanying text regarding our methodology for arriving at this set of cases. For these forty-eight cases, we collected both factual
and analytical data. See infra Appendix. The data compiled from each case included: the factual basis for a GINA claim; what other claims were brought; and the result of the order. We
also coded cases for those that involved discussion of a statutory term; these included the
meaning of “genetic information,” unlawful “requests,” “genetic tests,” “employees,” “employers,” and lawful wellness programs. Courts sometimes gave more than one reason for
their decision and, in the interest of completeness, multiple reasons were listed if they were
supplied by the court. Finally, we coded cases for those that involved common factual scenarios, such as requests for medical exams or records, family medical histories, fitness-for-duty
exams, wellness programs, workers’ compensation claims, drug tests, DNA tests, and HIV
tests.
As George Priest and Benjamin Klein observed in their landmark study, appellate cases are
neither random nor representative of disputes, which makes it difficult to draw inferences
from “legal rules to social behavior.” George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-4 (1984).
In particular, the claims that judges think are important enough to warrant an opinion.

pe

84.

er
r

ev

GINA claims. We define a “plausible” claim to mean that the actual facts relate
to GINA or that the plaintiff at least presents an argument for why GINA’s provisions should apply.84 These seventy-seven federal orders pertain to forty-eight
unique cases.85 For our study, we selected the order for each case that was most
relevant to the GINA claim.
Like any case study, our research has its limits. All of these disputes arise
under GINA’s employment provision, as the health-insurance title does not include an explicit private right of action. Generally speaking, very few disputes
are ever litigated, and even fewer go to trial or get appealed. Of those cases that
come before a judge and result in an opinion, many are unreported.86 Accordingly, some disputes that have arisen under GINA will naturally fall outside this
study. Nevertheless, this study does give us a window into some of the claims
being litigated,87 the relative strength of those claims, and which fact patterns
are likely to result in a finding of liability. Here we explore: (1) the judicial interpretation of GINA’s statutory terms; (2) common types of claims; and (3) the
juridical challenges in proving GINA violations.
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1. GINA’s Statutory Terms

First, the cases shed light on whom GINA has protected and how it has protected them. Like any statute, GINA requires interpretation. Our case study reveals that courts tend to resolve GINA claims on the basis of just a few statutory
terms. Of the forty-eight cases, thirty-one involve orders that turned, in part or
whole, on a specific provision of GINA, as depicted in Figure 1.88

ev

FIGURE 1.
CASES RESOLVED (IN PART OR WHOLE) UNDER GINA’S STATUTORY TERMS
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The other seventeen orders either involve a procedural resolution (such as dismissal because
the plaintiff failed to cooperate in discovery or prosecute the claim) or do not fully resolve the
claims (such as failure to dismiss because the claim is plausible or the plaintiff is found to
deserve more time to present supporting facts). Notably, the orders in these seventeen cases
do not construe substantive provisions of GINA.
89. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 201(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A)
(2018).
90. See supra note 84 (observing that in approximately sixty percent of cases in which there was a
GINA claim, the plaintiffs either did not plead any facts to support such a claim or pled facts
that could not conceivably warrant such a claim).
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Most cases turn on the meaning of “genetic information.” Recall that Congress defined genetic information as genetic-test results, genetic-test results of
family members, and family medical history.89 Even with this relatively precise
definition, plaintiffs appear to misuse the statute by treating “genetic discrimination” as a catch-all cause of action.90 In particular, nine of the eighteen cases
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Robinson v. Dungarvin Nev., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00902-JAD-PAL, 2018 WL 547225, at *5 (D.
Nev. Jan. 24, 2018) (“Race is protected under Title VII, not under GINA.”); Booker v. Gregg,
No. 1:16-CV-187-JDF, 2016 WL 443798, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016) (holding that stating
that one’s “genetics are African American” does not bring a plaintiff within GINA’s ambit).
Jacobs v. Donnelly Commc’ns, No. 1:13-CV-980-WSD, 2013 WL 5436682 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27,
2013) (finding that allergies are not “genetic information” under GINA).
Hoffman v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 631, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2015) (“Neither
Plaintiff’s HIV diagnosis, kidney failure, nor viral gastroenteritis, constitute genetic information about a manifested disease or disorder.”).
Duignan v. City of Chicago, 275 F. Supp. 3d 933, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Because plaintiff specifically alleges that her psychosis ‘was organic in nature and a clinical manifestation of Huntington’s disease,’ I conclude that she has pled herself out of any claim that defendant took an
adverse action against her based on her genetic information, as opposed to on her actual diagnosis of Huntington’s disease.”).
Bell v. PSS World Med., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-381-J-99MMH-JRK, 2012 WL 6761660, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2012) (“Because Plaintiff has failed to provide any basis, factual or otherwise, for the Court to reasonably infer that her hyperthyroidism, the ‘confidential information,’ or the ‘confidential medical conditions’ equate to genetic testing and/or genetic information, Plaintiff has failed to properly allege a valid claim under GINA.”).
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 210, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-9 (2018).
Id.
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resolved by the meaning of “genetic information” involve plaintiffs arguing essentially that their discrimination claims somehow have their origins in biology
and thus the employer violated GINA. This understandable but attenuated logic
is reflected in cases where the plaintiff alleges an adverse action under GINA
based on race,91 allergies,92 or manifested conditions, such as HIV,93 Huntington’s disease,94 or hyperthyroidism.95
Courts have resisted such sweeping interpretations by upholding the distinction between genetic information and other types of medical information. Congress anticipated that plaintiffs might confuse biological conditions with genetic
information and included a section in the statute expressly entitled “Medical Information that Is Not Genetic Information.”96 This section explains that an employee’s “manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that has or may
have a genetic basis” is not genetic information.97 Plaintiffs with employment
discrimination claims that relate to their own diagnoses or illnesses may well
prevail on a claim under the ADA, but are unlikely to succeed under GINA. Another source of confusion may be that a diagnosis or illness in a person’s family
constitutes genetic information. But once the person’s own genetic tendency becomes a diagnosable condition, that condition is not the person’s genetic information pursuant to GINA.
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Of course, if employees are being fired after taking genetic tests, they might still be securing
settlements from their employer.
See infra Section II.C.1.
Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. Atlanta, LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ga.
2015) (concerning an employer who required employees to submit to cheek swabs to try to
solve the mystery of who was defecating in the warehouse); Complaint at 2, Williamson v.
Fermi Nat’l Accelerator Lab., No. 1:13-CV-04221, 2015 WL 360382 (E.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2015)
(involving an employer who required an employee to provide a DNA sample in the course of
her employment).
Lewis v. Gov’t of the D.C., 161 F. Supp. 3d 15, 33 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that “nothing in the
Complaint suggests that, through its drug-test policy, the District requested genetic information as that phrase is defined by [GINA]” (emphasis omitted)).
Hoffman v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 631, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2015) (“[G]iven
that an HIV test is not a genetic test, any information Plaintiff alleges Defendant disclosed
about his HIV diagnosis or test contained in Plaintiff’s folder is not considered genetic information protected by GINA.”).
See, e.g., Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 824, 826 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that a required medical exam that included medical history, physical examination, blood
tests, urinalysis, vision test, hearing test, lung capacity test, chest x-ray, and stress test did not
fall under the meaning of “genetic test” in GINA); Fuentes v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t,
240 F. Supp. 3d 634, 644 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (same).
According to the CDC, “biometric screening” is “the measurement of physical characteristics
such as height, weight, body mass index, blood pressure, blood cholesterol, blood glucose,
and aerobic fitness tests that can be taken at the worksite and used as part of a workplace
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Perhaps the most surprising observation is that we did not identify any cases
in which the plaintiff opted to have her DNA tested.98 Even in the cases that
involved actual DNA tests, which are discussed further below,99 those employees
did not choose to be tested and the employer did not take any negative action
based upon the test results.100
Notwithstanding a lack of actual genetic tests, plaintiffs have read GINA’s
provisions broadly to oppose a variety of tests that they argue solicit genetic information. In this type of case, employers ask employees to undergo assessments, and the workers resist. Employers make these requests for many reasons,
from biometric screenings for employee-wellness programs to forensic genetic
testing for suspected conduct violations. These are not stories of employees who,
of their own volition, undergo testing and experience subsequent discrimination. These cases instead show that employers are seeking information about
their employees, and employees are pushing back. But courts have found that
drug tests,101 HIV tests,102 and biometric screenings103 are not genetic tests.
Health information obtained through biometric screenings,104 like those for
cholesterol and blood pressure, is another source of potential confusion. Biometric screenings are particularly common in employer-provided wellness pro-
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grams.105 Some litigants have attempted to challenge these requests for medical
information as violations of GINA.106 Claims may arise when employees feel
compelled to participate in a voluntary wellness program, perhaps because their
employer offers to further subsidize their insurance premiums in exchange for
participating. Employees may opt in but later resent participation and challenge
the wellness program. Alternatively, the employer may lawfully require employees to participate in a wellness program if it does not seek genetic (or disabilityrelated) information.107 A biometric screening, like a test for drugs or HIV, is not
“an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites that
detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.”108 Under the plain language of the statute, these are neither genetic tests nor requests for genetic data.
One court responding to a wellness-program claim quipped that the plaintiff
“appears to misread the statute as forbidding any mandatory wellness program,
regardless of whether it involves a request for or the acquisition of genetic information.”109 Depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff may have a valid ADA
claim related to nongenetic medical testing, but GINA does not cover such tests.
While the results of biometric screenings are not genetic information, family
medical history is. Cases involving requests for family medical history, as discussed further below,110 have generally been the most successful. Litigants have
also succeeded on claims alleging not just a request for family medical history,
but discrimination on that basis. In Bronsdon v. City of Naples,111 a firefighter was
diagnosed with hypertension and coronary artery disease, both of which were

106.
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105.

health assessment to benchmark and evaluate changes in employee health status over time.”
Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Workplace Health Glossary, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES
https://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/tools-resources/glossary
/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/UF4Q-EC8Z].
Wellness programs are broadly defined as “program[s] of health promotion or disease prevention.” 26 C.F.R § 54.9802-1(f) (2018). Healthcare.gov explains that wellness programs are
“program[s] intended to improve and promote health and fitness [that are] usually offered
through the work place, although insurance plans can offer them directly to their enrollees.
The program allows [an] employer or plan to offer [the employee] premium discounts, cash
rewards, gym memberships, and other incentives to participate.” Wellness Programs,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/wellness-programs [https://perma
.cc/3R7H-29E9]. It is therefore not the entity that provides the program but its content and
services that defines a wellness program.
Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826-27; Fuentes, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 644-45.
See, e.g., Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 201(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A)
(2018) (defining “genetic tests”).
Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826.
See infra Section II.C.
No. 2:13-CV-778-FtM-29CM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70502 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2014).
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Id. at *3.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. (quoting Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 68912, 68918 (Nov. 9, 2010) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.12(b) (2018))).
Most decisions in life are made for more than one reason, a reality that antidiscrimination law
has sought to address. Under section 703(m) of Title VII, if race, sex, religion, color, or national origin is a motivating factor for the employment practice, that act is unlawful. The
presence of other legitimate motives—even if the employer would have made the same decision absent the illegitimate motives—is not a defense for purposes of liability. However, in a
mixed-motive discrimination case, the defendant can still avoid economic damages (such as
back pay or front pay) or reinstatement by showing he would have made the same decision in
the absence of the illegal motivating factor. If the defendant can make this showing, the plaintiff is entitled only to declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2018).
Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 68916.
The EEOC has also supported this view with its observation that “GINA is concerned primarily with protecting those individuals who may be discriminated against because an employer thinks they are at increased risk of acquiring a condition in the future.” Background Information for EEOC Final Rule on Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
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related to his family medical history. When he filed for workers’ compensation
benefits, the City denied the claim based upon his “genetic information and family medical history.”112 The firefighter sued, claiming that the denial violated
GINA. The City countered that his manifested conditions prevented him from
advancing a claim under GINA.113 However, the court noted rather simply that
employers cannot discriminate based on family medical history, even if the individual has already manifested a related condition.114 The court relied on the
EEOC regulations, which make it clear that “genetic information of an individual
with a manifested disease is protected genetic information under GINA and that
discrimination against someone based on this information is prohibited.”115
Much like a “mixed-motives” claim under Title VII,116 genetic information and
an employee’s manifested condition may sometimes fuse, making it hard to say
which is responsible for an act of discrimination. In such instances, the employer
may still be held liable because an impermissible consideration has tainted the
decision.
Despite robust protection for family medical history, some courts have limited the scope of genetic information in contravention of the plain meaning of
the statute. GINA’s text covers “manifested conditions” in family members and
does not limit those conditions to ones that are hereditary.117 Regardless, some
courts have found that family medical history is only genetic information if it
communicates genetic risk. In practical terms, these courts are taking the position that genetic information must be predictive.118
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2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations
/gina-background.cfm [https://perma.cc/APW8-3VJW].
852 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 (W.D. Va. 2012).
Id. at 731.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 201(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(3) (2018)
(defining family members as dependents and any other first-, second-, third-, or fourth-degree relatives).
Conner-Goodgame v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:12-CV-03426-IPJ, 2013 WL 5428448, at
*11 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013).
See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 201(3).
Conner-Goodgame, 2013 WL 5428448, at *32 (holding that an employee’s mother’s AIDS is not
genetic information with respect to that employee because the employee has “no chance of
acquiring HIV in the future as a result of her deceased mother’s AIDS”).
See Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV, HIV.GOV (May 15, 2017), https://www
.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/hiv-prevention/reducing-mother-to-child-risk/preventing-mother-to
-child-transmission-of-hiv [https://perma.cc/8TZQ-TKDJ] (“An HIV-positive mother can
transmit HIV to her baby [] during pregnancy, childbirth (also called labor and delivery), or
breastfeeding.”).
Conner-Goodgame, 2013 WL 5428448, at *32.
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text; infra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
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Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, L.L.C.,119 the first in this line of cases, dealt with
an employee whose wife had multiple sclerosis (MS). The court held that the
wife’s MS was not genetic information because it “has no predictive value with
respect to Poore’s genetic propensity to acquire the disease.”120 Further, while
genetic information is defined to include the manifestation of a disease in a family member, family members are in turn defined in such a way as to exclude
spouses.121 The court ultimately reasoned that because a spouse’s MS does not
communicate genetic risk, it cannot be genetic information.
Another court dismissed a GINA claim brought by an employee whose
mother had HIV/AIDS.122 Diagnosed HIV/AIDS is quite clearly a manifested
condition and, unlike spouses, mothers are unequivocally family members under
the statute. Thus, on its face, GINA would seem to apply.123 Yet the court found
that the employee was not at risk of acquiring HIV/AIDS124 because HIV/AIDS
can only be transmitted from mother to child in three ways: during pregnancy,
during childbirth, or through breastfeeding.125 Thus, according to the court, the
employee had no GINA claim because she had no actual genetic risk of acquiring
HIV/AIDS.126 However, Poore and its progeny may be misguided. As explained,
nothing in the plain language of GINA’s definition of covered genetic information requires that genetic tests or family medical history communicate genetic
risk.127
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2. Common GINA Claims

A different way of analyzing GINA’s cases is to cluster them by recurring
factual scenarios. Of the forty-eight plausible GINA cases, certain types of facts
and allegations tend to predominate. The starting point is the plaintiff’s posture
as it relates to employment.

ev

FIGURE 2.128
THE PLAINTIFF’S POSTURE
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These claims are a snapshot of what we coded and included in a table as the Appendix. The
employment harms span forty-eight cases, but the number of employment harms here adds
up to more than forty-eight because employees sometimes experienced more than one type
of harm (for example, perhaps they were denied reinstatement, harassed, and subsequently
terminated).
129. There are stark informational barriers that prevent victims of discrimination from detecting
and bringing failure-to-hire claims. Any contact between an applicant and an employer is
“typically fleeting, the eventual outcome is unknown to the candidate, and the process itself
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As Figure 2 indicates, the majority (twenty-six plaintiffs, or approximately
fifty-four percent) sued after being terminated by their employer. Few cases involved claims that the employer failed to hire the plaintiff. This result is consistent with the frequently observed difficulty of bringing failure-to-hire employment discrimination cases.129 Interestingly, five of the claims involved no
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obvious adverse employment action or constructive discharge,130 a result made
possible by the fact that GINA forbids certain types of inquiries even where there
is no actual discriminatory treatment.131
The actual claims provide a second frame that illuminates how plaintiffs use
GINA, as shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3.132
PREDOMINANCE OF CERTAIN CLAIMS
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As explained in Part I, GINA has both privacy and antidiscrimination provisions. First, it is unlawful to “request, require, or purchase” genetic information, subject to several exceptions.133 Second, employers cannot use genetic
information—regardless of how it is obtained—to discriminate. Discrimination
claims have naturally predominated. After all, this way of framing claims is

131.
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130.

rarely signals exclusionary intent.” Michael Fix et al., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 1,
14 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993).
These cases are coded as “n/a” under Employee’s Posture.
See supra Section I.B.3.c.
These claims are coded and included in a table as the Appendix. The number of cases here
adds up to more than forty-eight because plaintiffs sometimes advance more than one claim
under GINA.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)
(2018). The three most notable anomalies are wellness programs, inadvertent requests of family medical history, and instances where an employer purchases publicly available documents
that include family medical history. Id. § 202(b)(1)-(2), (4). The other three exceptions concern compliance with other laws, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act and genetic monitoring regulations, or ensuring the integrity of law enforcement. Id. § 202(b)(3), (5)-(6).
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standard under existing federal discrimination laws. But many GINA claims in
the past ten years have been simply for unlawful requests.
Another way that plaintiffs appear to be wielding GINA as a privacy shield
is by claiming that an employer, who may have legally obtained genetic information, disclosed that information in violation of GINA. If an employer has acquired genetic information through one of GINA’s statutory exceptions, it must
safeguard that information. But in seven (approximately fifteen percent) of the
cases, plaintiffs claimed that their employers disclosed or shared confidential genetic information with other employees or coworkers. This set of cases may
demonstrate that employees do not want their confidential information shared
with other people at work. We found that nearly forty percent of all cases involved claims based upon requests for family medical history, requests for medical exams or records, or the employer’s alleged disclosure of genetic information.134
Finally, wellness programs reemerge as another area of sensitivity for plaintiffs. Most recently, this issue has captured the attention of several important
advocacy groups, such as AARP, an advocacy group for older Americans, and
those that advocate for people with disabilities. They are concerned that health
disclosures under wellness plans would create disadvantage for their members
or clients in the workplace.135

There are twelve cases that involve claims for unlawful requests and seven that involve the
claim that the employer unlawfully disclosed genetic information. See infra Appendix.
135. See, e.g., LeaMond Statement, supra note 81 (“Older workers in particular are more likely to
have the very types of less visible medical conditions and disabilities—such as diabetes, heart
disease, and cancer—that are at risk of disclosure by wellness questionnaires and exams. By
financially coercing employees into surrendering their personal health information, these
rules will weaken medical privacy and civil rights protections.”).
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FIGURE 4.136
PREDOMINANCE OF CERTAIN FACTS
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As Figure 4 makes clear, a host of GINA cases involve plaintiffs bringing
claims based on requests for medical exams or records. Many of these requests
simultaneously solicit individual and family medical history, the latter often
through questions about how one’s parents died or whether family members
have experienced certain medical conditions. Family medical history may also
surface in a factual context where the employer asks an employee to undergo a
fitness-for-duty assessment.137 At other times, the allegedly improper request
pertains to a legally sanctioned process, such as seeking accommodations under
the ADA, unemployment benefits, or workers’ compensation benefits.138 Employers sometimes also request family medical history in conjunction with wellness programs as part of their health risk assessment.139 Still other times, the
family medical history is voluntarily disclosed or somehow otherwise discovThese facts are just a sampling of what we coded and included in a table as the Appendix.
See supra fig.4; see also infra Appendix. (identifying nine federal cases with plausible GINA
claims where the factual scenario included a fitness-for-duty examination).
138. See supra fig.4; see also infra Appendix. (identifying federal cases with plausible GINA claims
where the factual scenario included a workers’ compensation claim and unemployment compensation claims, as well as other instances where genetic discrimination may be at issue).
139. See supra fig.4; see also infra Appendix. (identifying federal cases with plausible GINA claims,
including two where the factual scenario included a mandatory wellness-program assessment).
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ered. Finally, falling outside of the family-medical-history context are direct tests
that employees must sometimes undergo. The most common are drug tests—
which are usually not a problem under the statute140—but there are other types
of exams that may solicit genetic information and thus violate GINA.
3. Challenges in Proving Violations

rin

141.

But cf. Sullivan v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. C15-1184JLR, 2015 WL 6439097 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
22, 2015) (involving a drug test in the form of a cheek swab that enabled handlers to collect
plaintiff’s genetic data, but not answering the question of whether GINA permits the drug
test and instead holding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy GINA’s administrative-exhaustion
requirement).
No. 1:16-CV-00102, 2018 WL 2118311, at *1-2 (M.D. Tenn. May 8, 2018).
Complaint at 1, 4-7, Williams, 2018 WL 2118311 (No. 1:16-CV-00102); see also Williams, 2018
WL 2118311, at *9 (“Plaintiff argues [that] Lee repeatedly questioned Plaintiff about his cancer.”).
Williams, 2018 WL 2118311, at *9.
The court in Williams did not squarely address whether Graphic Packaging actually discriminated or acted based on information related to Williams’s cancer.
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Employees have encountered difficulty establishing valid GINA claims under
both the privacy and antidiscrimination provisions. Specifically, GINA’s many
exceptions for acquiring genetic information may undermine a seemingly valid
claim. Consider the exception for inadvertent acquisition, for example. In Williams v. Graphic Packaging International, the plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate
cancer and, after inappropriate behavior at work, was eventually terminated.141
He alleged genetic discrimination, including that he was questioned repeatedly
about cancer test results and treatment options.142 But the court noted that Williams voluntarily disclosed to three coworkers “that cancer ran in his family.”143
While a family medical history of cancer is unequivocally genetic information,
the employer did not unlawfully request or obtain it.144 (However, if the employer had asked Williams about his family medical history, that would have
been enough to sustain a cause of action under GINA—even without an adverse
employment action.)
Another difficulty for plaintiffs has sometimes come in the context of wellness programs. Recall that employers can request, through a health-care professional or genetic counselor, genetic information in the context of a wellness program as long as employees participate voluntarily and provide written
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See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
Lee v. City of Moraine Fire Dep’t, No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
3, 2015) (finding that a mandatory request for genetic information cannot qualify under the
wellness-program exception since the touchstone of this exception is that the program is voluntary).
Id. at *12.
See, e.g., Higgins v. Union Pac. R.R., 303 F. Supp. 3d 945, 962 (D. Neb. 2018) (noting that the
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that his employer received
his “entire medical chart,” which allegedly included plaintiff’s genetic information); Jones v.
Foxx, No. 16-2207-CM, 2018 WL 705665, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2018) (noting that “[t]he
uncontroverted facts show that Smith was unaware that plaintiff had sickle cell”); Rusthoven
v. Victor Sch. Dist. No. 7, No. CV 14-170-M-DLC, 2014 WL 6460190, at *4 (D. Mont. Nov.
17, 2014) (observing that the plaintiff did not allege that his genetic information was ever seen
by a decision-maker or by plaintiff’s coworkers); Tovar v. United Airlines Inc., 985 F. Supp.
2d 862, 874-75 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding no evidence that decision-makers were aware of the
employee’s family medical history when they terminated the employee).
Alternatively, an employer is sometimes able to show that the genetic information in question
was actually unavailable at the time of the adverse employment decision. See Carroll v. Comprehensive Women’s Health Servs., No. 3:16CV1509, 2017 WL 4284386, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
27, 2017) (observing that the employee was fired one day after her genetic testing, and thus
before her employer could have known the results).
See, e.g., Leone v. N.J. Orthopaedic Specialists, P.A., No. 11-3957 (ES), 2012 WL 1535198, at *6
(D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2012) (observing that “the allegation fails to plausibly support the theory that
[the defendant] based his decision on the results of genetic tests”).
Out of the 184 federal court decisions in which courts considered a claim under GINA, only
four of those came from federal appellate courts, and only two involved plausible GINA
claims. See infra Appendix.
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consent.145 Thus, as one court found, a mandatory wellness program that requests genetic information would violate the statute.146 However, where the program was deemed voluntary, a misguided plaintiff could not claim his employer
had impermissibly acquired genetic information.147
Claimants have had even less luck establishing claims for genetic discrimination that turn on whether an employer took an adverse employment action
based on genetic information. The first failure is the most rudimentary: an employee is sometimes unable to show that the employer possessed the employee’s
genetic information.148 In these cases, employees allege genetic discrimination
but fail to establish that decision-makers were actually aware of the employee’s
genetic information.149 These claims are dead on arrival since an employer cannot base a decision on facts she does not know.
In a second category of unsuccessful claims of genetic discrimination, the
employer may have had access to genetic information, but there is no evidence
that the employer took any adverse employment action.150 For example, in one
federal appellate case—a rarity among GINA claims151—a staffing agency termi-
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156.

Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1052.
Id.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Cummins Power Generation Inc., 313 F.R.D. 93 (D. Minn. 2015); Lee v. City
of Moraine Fire Dep’t, No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2015); EEOC v.
Founders Pavilion, Inc., No. 13-CV-6250 (CJS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81439 (W.D.N.Y. Jan.
9, 2014); see also Mark A. Rothstein et al., Limiting Occupational Medical Evaluations Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 41 AM. J.L. &
MED. 523, 554 (2015) (reviewing valid GINA claims that showed violations predominantly
involved requests for family medical history); sources cited infra note 211 (announcing settlements that have prevailed on this type of factual claim).
See infra Appendix.
For example, not dismissing a GINA claim for an alleged failure to arbitrate prior to filing a
lawsuit. Jefferson v. Fannie Mae, No. 4:13-CV-00604-ALM-CAN, 2016 WL 5339702 (E.D.
Tex. July 29, 2016).
For example, granting a plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery under GINA. Harris v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:16-CV-381, 2018 WL 2729131 (D. Neb. June 6, 2018).
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nated a temporary employee after she missed a significant amount of work for
breast-cancer testing.152 The employee alleged that she told various people at
work about her family medical history of breast cancer.153 She then claimed that
her employer may have acted on assumptions about her need for treatment based
on that information.154 The court concluded that even though the employer possessed statutorily protected genetic information and took an adverse employment action, a finding of discrimination “would require rank speculation” about
what the employer assumed “about the role of a family medical history of breast
cancer on a breast-cancer patient’s treatment and recovery.”155 In short, there
was no compelling story to support the argument that genetic information motivated the decision to terminate the employee.
Strikingly, in GINA’s first decade, we uncovered no cases alleging discrimination based on genetic-test results, which could affirm commentators’ suspicions that GINA is not doing much work as an antidiscrimination statute. Insofar as people are successfully suing under GINA, requests for family medical
history are carrying the day.156 GINA cases also signal that plaintiffs have not
had much success in reported decisions during the statute’s first ten years. In
particular, out of the set of forty-eight cases, twelve came to positive results for
the plaintiffs,157 and seven of those twelve were either left unresolved158 or were
procedural victories for the plaintiff.159 Finally, the small universe of cases seems
to confirm the belief that GINA is useless or perhaps unnecessary. Our case study
might thus appear to preliminarily validate some of the criticisms of the statute.
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B. GINA as a Failure

ev

One interpretation of GINA’s first ten years is that the statute is a failure. In
fact, from the moment GINA passed, it garnered significant criticism.160 Ten
years later, the commentary is not much rosier.161 In fact, the scholarly reaction
to GINA has been almost entirely negative.162 There is a significant disconnect
between what the statute has done and what it was intended to do. Recall that
the paradigmatic GINA violation is discrimination on the basis of a genetic test.
It is now clear that courts are not deciding and reporting cases that fit the paradigm. Here, we explore the reasons why so many commentators have dubbed
GINA a failure.
1. GINA Is Ineffective

er
r

Typical criticism includes that GINA is ineffective, useless, or both. Arguably,
GINA did not yet deliver on its original promise in the ten years following the
law’s passage as the rates of medical genetic testing remained largely stagnant.163

Scholars were quick to criticize the new law. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from
Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 50
n.384 (2010) (arguing that GINA “lacks bravado” and suffers from a variety of limitations);
Pauline T. Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives from the U.S. Experience,
31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 693, 700-02 (2010) (asserting that GINA’s exceptions for lawfully
obtaining genetic information could open the door to discrimination); Roberts, supra note 61,
at 634-47 (arguing for amending the statute to prohibit unintentional discrimination and allow for accommodations); Rothstein, supra note 30, at 174 (calling GINA “fatally flawed”).
161. See, e.g., Kathy L. Hudson & Karen Pollitz, Undermining Genetic Privacy? Employee Wellness
Programs and the Law, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2017) (arguing that GINA’s wellness-program
exceptions could be expanded to compromise genetic privacy); Rothstein, supra note 68 (criticizing GINA’s applicability and coverage); Jessica D. Tenenbaum & Kenneth W. Goodman,
Beyond the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: Ethical and Economic Implications of the
Exclusion of Disability, Long-Term Care and Life Insurance, 14 FUTURE MED. 153, 153-54 (2017)
(arguing that disability and long-term-care insurance are more like health insurance than life
insurance and should therefore be within GINA’s coverage); Sarah Zhang, DNA Got a Kid
Kicked Out of School—And It’ll Happen Again, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www
.wired.com/2016/02/schools-kicked-boy-based-dna [https://perma.cc/A5JV-WKX7] (criticizing GINA for not covering education or housing).
162. But see Barbara J. Evans, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act at Age 10: GINA’s Controversial Assertion that Data Transparency Protects Privacy and Civil Rights, 60 WM. & MARY L.
REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that GINA has been unfairly criticized and that, through the
federal regulations governing the HIPAA Privacy Rule, GINA implicitly includes a right to
access one’s genetic data).
163. See Sharon Begley, Consumers Aren’t Wild About Genetic Testing—Nor Are Doctors, STAT (Feb.
12, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/12/consumers-arent-wild-genetic-testing
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While stagnant rates of medical genetic testing may strike some readers as odd,
there has only recently been a meaningful uptick in genetic testing, since the FDA
approved direct-to-consumer testing for genetic disease risks in April of 2017.164
But insofar as the goal of the legislation was to increase medical genetic testing,
the law itself does not appear to have had a meaningful impact during its first
decade. There are several possible reasons for that failure.
a. Lack of Awareness

er
r

ev

Despite a grueling thirteen-year legislative history, GINA passed without
much fanfare. In fact, the law barely registered as a cultural phenomenon. Several years after GINA was legislated, over eighty percent of Americans were unaware that the law even existed.165 There are at least four reasons for this unawareness.
First, GINA was a relatively unexciting statute upon arrival, the product of
an enfeebling compromise with the insurance community and other business
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-doctors [https://perma.cc/2XAF-ABLQ]; The Public and Genetic Editing, Testing, and Therapy, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH 5 (Jan. 2016), https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp
-content/uploads/sites/94/2016/01/STAT-Harvard-Poll-Jan-2016-Genetic-Technology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BW7P-QY7V].
164. Alzheimer’s Found, of Am., Genetic Testing: Thinking About an At-Home Test for Alzheimer’s
Risk Gene?, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases
/genetic-testing-thinking-about-an-at-home-test-for-alzheimers-risk-gene-300725402.html
[https://perma.cc/Y86U-ZMTZ]. The direct-to-consumer genetic-testing industry has
grown from $15 million in sales in 2010 to more than $99 million in 2017. Additionally, the
genetic-testing industry is projected to reach $310 million in sales by 2022, with approximately
100 million consumers by that time. Razib Khan & David Mittelman, Consumer Genomics Will
Change Your Life, Whether You Get Tested or Not, GENOME BIOLOGY (Aug. 20, 2018), https://
genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-018-1506-1 [https://perma.cc
/6AZS-874Q]; Ellen Matloff, Building a Bridge from Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests to Reality,
FORBES (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenmatloff/2018/09/23/building
-a-bridge-from-direct-to-consumer-genetic-tests-to-reality
[https://perma.cc/QD6H
-9XQF]. Moreover, new findings from the National Poll on Healthy Aging show that one in
ten older adults has taken genetic tests offered to consumers, and one in twenty has taken
genetic tests ordered by a doctor. Kara Gavin, Older Adults Have High Interest in Genetic Testing—And Some Reservations, U. MICH. HEALTH LAB (Oct. 1, 2018), https://labblog.uofmhealth
.org/lab-report/older-adults-have-high-interest-genetic-testing-and-some-reservations
[https://perma.cc/TQR6-8G4C]. Most older adults surveyed “expressed interest in getting
DNA tests to guide medical care, understand health risks or know their ancestry.” Id. In sum,
genetic testing has not yet occupied a seat in mainstream society, but the second decade of
GINA will likely see a significant uptick in genetic testing.
165. Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 42, 62
(2013) (observing that “a nationally representative survey from 2011 indicated that fewer than
one in five Americans (16%) are aware [GINA] exists”).
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Jeremy Gruber, The New Genetic Nondiscrimination Act—How It Came to Pass and What It Does,
COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS 2 (2009), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics
.org/pagedocuments/pgwogj2f3o.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CYU-Y4YB] (“GINA suffered in
obscurity for a number of years as the result of a Republican led Congress that was hostile to
adding additional restrictions on the insurance industry and employer communities.”); Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (“The Congressional deliberations for GINA were long and difficult.
The original bill was introduced in 1995, and for many years, it did not look as if the bill would
ever emerge from committee. Several of its provisions raised concerns for insurers, employers,
and other stakeholders. After thirteen years, the controversial provisions were either deleted,
revised, or clarified.”).
Ming-Yi Huang et al., Awareness of the US Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008:
An Online Survey, 4 J. PHARMACEUTICAL HEALTH SERVS. RES. 235, 236 (2013).
Dawn C. Allain et al., Consumer Awareness and Attitudes About Insurance Discrimination Post
Enactment of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 11 FAMILIAL CANCER 637, 640
(2012).
Id. at 640-42.
Amanda L. Laedtke et al., Family Physicians’ Awareness and Knowledge of the Genetic Information
Non-Discrimination Act (GINA), 21 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 345, 348 (2012).
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interests.166 Second, unlike the social movements that propelled the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, GINA was not backed
by a dynamic and organized coalition that could champion the legislation. Third,
one of GINA’s two substantive titles became largely moot only two years after
the law passed. In 2010, the ACA eliminated much of the need for GINA’s healthinsurance protections by outlawing preexisting-condition exclusions, shifting
away from health-status-based ratings, and cobbling together near-universal
health-insurance coverage for Americans. Finally, whereas earlier antidiscrimination laws targeted a history of discrimination, GINA did not respond to past
or even current subordination. Rather, GINA was uniquely prophylactic, attempting to head off a form of bias before it could really harm anyone. Taken
together, GINA was a federal antidiscrimination statute that the average person
knew nothing about.
While genetic information continues to be a hot-button issue, very few
Americans are aware of GINA’s protections. Another study conducted three
years after GINA’s passage found that out of 295 respondents only twenty-six (a
disappointing 8.8%) had heard of the law, and only ten (3.4%) understood the
scope of its protections.167 In fact, a study after GINA went into effect found that
out of 1,699 individuals, 60.5% were concerned about health-insurance discrimination and 28.6% were concerned about employment discrimination based on
genetic information.168 Unsurprisingly, 54.3% of people surveyed in that study
had not even heard of GINA.169 The law has not performed much better with
medical professionals. A survey of 401 physicians reported that 54.5% had no
knowledge of GINA.170 A law cannot alleviate fears over genetic testing or ward
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off discrimination if no one knows about it. As such, GINA may be long overdue
for a public-awareness campaign.
b. Limited Scope

c. Narrow Protected Status

er
r

ev

Another line of critique posits that, regardless of how many people know
about the statute, GINA does not cover enough potentially discriminatory conduct. Some have pointed out that GINA limits its protections to health insurance
and employment, leaving people susceptible to discrimination in life insurance,
long-term-care insurance, disability insurance, education, housing, criminal investigations, and commercial transactions.171 At least two states, Illinois and California, have taken action to address this limited scope.172 For example, California passed a law to add genetic information as a protected class to its
antidiscrimination law. Drafters of the state legislation, dubbed CalGINA, explained that they found GINA’s current scope “incomplete for Californians.”173
This law expanded genetic-information protection to include housing, emergency services, mortgage lending, and commercial transactions.174

pe

Other criticisms of GINA’s reach center on its definitions of genetic information and discrimination. Some scholars believe that potential discriminators,
See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (“GINA does not prohibit genetic discrimination in life
insurance, disability insurance, long-term care insurance, mortgage insurance, educational
opportunities, or commercial and real property transactions. A broader bill would have been
extremely unlikely to get the necessary support in Congress.”); Mark A. Rothstein, Putting
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in Context, 10 GENETICS MED. 655, 655 (2008)
[hereinafter Rothstein, Nondiscrimination Act in Context] (observing that GINA is seriously
deficient, in part because it does not apply to life insurance, disability insurance, long-termcare insurance, or other uses of genetic information); Tenenbaum & Goodman, supra note
161, at 154 (arguing that disability and long-term-care insurance are more like health insurance than life insurance and should therefore be within GINA’s coverage); Zhang, supra note
161 (criticizing GINA for not covering education or housing).
172. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Illinois Lawmakers Decide to Support Enhancements to Genetic Privacy
Law, EMP. DISCRIMINATION REP. BNA No. 30 (June 25, 2008) (noting GINA prompted Illinois to pass state legislation that expands the universe of covered employers and creates a
“stiffer enforcement regimen”); Jennifer K. Wagner, A New Law to Raise GINA’s Floor in California, PRIVACY REP. (Dec. 7, 2011), https://theprivacyreport.com/2011/12/07/a-new-law-to
-raise-ginas-floor-in-california [https://perma.cc/5ZHY-LSBP].
173. See CalGINA, ch. 261, § 1(j), 2011 Cal. Stat. 2774, 2776.
174. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing protections provided by the California
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act).
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Epigenetic discrimination refers to the adverse treatment or abusive profiling of individuals
based on external changes to genes that do not alter the underlying DNA sequence. For example, epigenetic modifications occur in the body because of smoking. An employer with access to this information may then decide not to hire that person. See Charles Dupras et al.,
Epigenetic Discrimination: Emerging Application of Epigenetics Pointing to the Limitations of Policies Against Genetic Discrimination, 9 FRONTIERS GENETICS 1 (2018) (describing the possibility
of epigenetic discrimination); Riya R. Kanherkar et al., Epigenetics Across the Human Lifespan,
2 FRONTIERS CELL & DEVELOPMENTAL BIO. 1, 11-12 (2014), https://www.frontiersin.org
/articles/10.3389/fcell.2014.00049/full [https://perma.cc/CS3M-S2KP] (discussing the environmental impact of smoking on epigenetics).
See Rothstein, supra note 68, at 6 (“The definition does not appear to cover epigenetic marks,
microbiome data, or various other emerging biological measures. As a matter of science,
GINA has been frozen in time for at least ten years, and it may be increasingly difficult to
prove discrimination resulting from information developed by emerging technologies.”).
See Roberts, supra note 61, at 637; Rothstein, supra note 68, at 6. (“The problem is that there
is a large gap between these statutes, and some individuals may not be covered under either
law. This would include individuals who have a biomarker of genome-environment interaction, a subclinical marker of aberrant gene expression, or an initial symptom of a gene-associated disease.”); Rothstein, Nondiscrimination Act in Context, supra note 171, at 655.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 101(c)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(4)
(2018).
Id. § 202(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 202(b)(3).
Id. § 202(b)(5).
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particularly insurers, will be interested in epigenetic information.175 Yet at present it is unclear whether GINA covers epigenetic markers, the microbiome, or
myriad other kinds of biological information related to new technologies.176
GINA’s failure to cover manifested conditions—even ones that are genetic in nature—has been identified as another area of vulnerability, because the line between asymptomatic and manifested conditions is often not clear-cut.177 Finally,
despite the inclusion of a privacy provision, GINA actually takes a relatively conservative approach to what constitutes discrimination. Other federal antidiscrimination statutes cover unintentional discrimination and offer positive differential treatment, like accommodations and diversity initiatives. As noted, GINA
fails to cover unintentional discrimination or to require positive action.
GINA’s exceptions have also ensured a narrowly protected status. GINA expressly allows health insurers and employers to lawfully obtain genetic information under certain circumstances, such as to conduct research,178 to provide
wellness programs,179 to comply with medical-leave laws,180 and to monitor exposure to toxic substances.181 These exceptions could create opportunities to discriminate. Indeed, when members of Congress proposed a bill to expand well-
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ness programs, some feared that these changes would undermine genetic privacy
and lead to future discrimination.182
2. GINA Is Unnecessary

183.
184.
185.
186.

rin

187.

Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 161, at 1-2 (arguing that GINA’s wellness-program exceptions
could be expanded to compromise genetic privacy).
Roberts, supra note 13, at 470.
See id. at 466-68.
Kim, supra note 160, at 696.
Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Energy & Labor, 110th Cong. 45 (2007) (statement of Burton J. Fishman, Counsel to the GINE Coalition).
Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (asserting that “[t]he Affordable Care Act, enacted in 2010,
prohibits discrimination based on health status, making Title I of GINA largely irrelevant”).
Id.
Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1187-88.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2018).
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Beyond merely being ineffective, GINA has also faced criticism for being unnecessary in the first place. By all accounts, genetic discrimination was not happening on a widespread basis when Congress passed the law.183 Most of the examples in the legislative history were anecdotal,184 and there were no reported
cases under the thirty-four state statutes that predated GINA.185 Thus, one opponent of GINA testified before Congress that GINA was “a remedy in search of
a problem.”186
Additionally, even if we needed GINA’s health-insurance protections in
2008, we arguably do not need them now. The ACA, passed two years after
GINA, rendered moot some of GINA’s most central provisions.187 The ACA
solved many of the problems GINA sought to address—and it did so for all medically relevant information, not just genetic data.188 It banned preexisting condition exclusions, eliminated health-status-based rating in the individual and
small group markets, and outlawed medical underwriting.189 After the ACA,
health insurers could no longer deny coverage for preexisting conditions, set discriminatory premiums, or make eligibility decisions based on any medically relevant risk-related information, including genetic information. The ACA also
regulates employer-provided wellness programs and prohibits insurance companies from using wellness programs to rate the risks of its members.190
Consequently, the ACA rendered several key provisions of Title I of GINA
useless; but that is not to say Title I of GINA has no value in a post-ACA world.
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C. GINA as a Success
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For example, the law still prevents health insurers from asking for genetic-test
results or family medical history. Of course, if Congress were to repeal the ACA
or the Supreme Court were to revisit the statute’s constitutionality following the
recent conservative shift of the Court’s composition, Title I of GINA would again
have an important role to play.
One could also advance the argument that GINA’s provisions are unnecessary based on data about the charges filed. Beginning in 2010, the first year that
charges could realistically be filed based upon the effective date of the statute,
the number of charges rose each year for several years.191 The EEOC reported
201 complaints of genetic discrimination in 2010, 245 complaints in 2011, 280
complaints in 2012, and 333 complaints in both 2013 and 2014.192 This steady
progression led at least one commentator to observe “a trend towards increased
occurrences of genetic discrimination.”193 But the upward trend has now reshaped into a bell curve. There were only 257 complaints in 2015, 238 complaints
in 2016, and 206 complaints in 2017—representing a return to the volume of
charges filed during the first full year the statute was in effect.194 It is not clear
exactly what is driving these statistics, but the EEOC’s own numbers do not support a narrative of increasing genetic discrimination.
As explained above, Congress likely only included employment in GINA’s
protections because so many Americans hold employer-provided health-insurance policies. But in an interesting twist of fate, the employment title, which was
perhaps somewhat of an afterthought, is now GINA’s most important protection.
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While one might be tempted to judge GINA as a failure based on our case
study, that would be a mistake. Even though claimants have not brought many
successful claims for genetic discrimination, they have won—at least in the reported cases—for violations of their privacy. A close study of these cases reveals
that GINA has been interpreted broadly in the area of privacy. Thus, where
GINA has not obviously been a robust bulwark against discrimination, it has
succeeded in safeguarding sensitive information.

Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPEEOC Change Statistics], https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z9K3-C246].
192. Id.
193. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75, 78 (2016).
194. EEOC Change Statistics, supra note 191.
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Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
196. Id. at 1367 (“It is not unreasonable for Congress to achieve this ‘national and uniform basic
standard’ of full protection by broadly prohibiting employers from requesting, requiring, or
purchasing genetic information of their employees, except under limited circumstances.”).
197. For an example of a potential GINA ancestry claim, see Tim Marcin, White Michigan Cop Files
Racism Lawsuit After Ancestry.com Revealed He’s Part Black, NEWSWEEK (May 10, 2017), http://
www.newsweek.com/white-cop-sues-michigan-city-racism-after-ancestrycom-revealed-hes
-part-black-607004 [https://perma.cc/8FNJ-REKL], which illustrates the discrimination
one police officer experienced after revealing to his colleagues that he was partially black.
198. No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2015).
199. Id. at *4-5.
200. Id. at *11.
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Courts have protected employee privacy broadly with respect to both genetic-test results and family medical history. Perhaps the most notorious lawsuit
in GINA’s first ten years was Lowe v. Atlas Logistics, also known as the case of the
“devious defecator.”195 When a company discovered that a disgruntled employee
was defecating in its warehouse, the employer required two suspects to take genetic tests to compare their results to the feces. Although the test results exonerated the employees, they sued, obtaining a $2.2 million jury verdict. In a line of
reasoning similar to Poore, the defendants invoked GINA’s legislative history to
argue that the statute, which was designed with medical genetic testing in mind,
should not cover forensic genetic testing. Following the plain language of the
statute and Congress’s legislative intent,196 the court rejected this narrow construction of genetic information, finding that GINA covers nonmedical genetic
testing. The breadth of Lowe’s finding could provide a foundation for applying
GINA to a wide variety of nonpredictive genetic testing, including forensics, paternity, and ancestry.197 In short, Lowe’s construction supports understanding
GINA as a robust protection for employee privacy.
Courts have been similarly generous in cases dealing with requests for family
medical history. In Lee v. City of Moraine Fire Department, the city required firefighters to undergo an annual health and wellness physical, which included a
questionnaire that asked about family medical history of heart disease.198 When
one firefighter refused the physical, the department fired him for insubordination.199 He sued, alleging that the employer violated GINA by asking for his family medical history. The court observed that “the text of GINA is clear” and that
the department had plainly requested genetic information.200 The fire depart-
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ment countered that it was the doctor administering the physicals—not the department itself—that added the prohibited inquiry.201 The court quickly cited
GINA’s definition of “employer,” which includes agents of the employer.202 It
also quoted GINA’s regulations, which require employers to affirmatively instruct their health-care providers “not to collect genetic information, including
family medical history, as part of a medical examination intended to determine
the ability to perform a job.”203 After all, even though some genetic information
may be necessary to positively diagnose a manifested disease or disorder, “there
does not appear to be a case in which the diagnosis, as opposed to the signs and
symptoms, is necessary to evaluate an individual’s ability to perform a particular
job.”204
2. EEOC Interpretations of GINA as a Privacy Protection

Id.
202. Id. at *11-12.
203. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2018)).
204. Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg.
68912, 68927 (Nov. 9, 2010).
205. 191 F. Supp. 3d 994, 998 (W.D. Mo. 2016).
206. Id.
207. 313 F.R.D. 93, 96 (D. Minn. 2015).
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The EEOC has also embraced a vision of GINA as an employee-privacy statute by pursuing cases for requests for family medical history. In EEOC v. Grisham
Farm Products, Inc., the employer required applicants to reveal whether they had
consulted with any medical professionals in the last two years and to identify
whether any future diagnostic testing had been discussed.205 The court observed
that these questions “would require an applicant without the manifestation of,
for example, high blood pressure, heart disease, or breast cancer, who has preventatively ‘consulted’ with a physician or been told by a physician to get diagnostic testing in light of their family medical history or risk factors, to reveal such
information” to the employer.206 According to the court, this solicitation plainly
violated GINA.
The EEOC has also settled cases related to requests for family medical history. In EEOC v. Cummins Power Generation Inc., the employer sought family
medical history in the course of a fitness-for-duty assessment.207 While the defendants attempted to argue that the third parties who drafted the medical releases were indispensable parties to the litigation, the court maintained that the
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employer violated GINA, leading to a settlement agreement.208 EEOC v. Founders
Pavilion, Inc. also resulted in a settlement related to an employer request for family medical history in conjunction with postoffer medical exams.209
GINA claims are adjudicated not only in courts, but also by the EEOC. While
structural litigation by the EEOC has been characterized as typically achieving
only “modest” or “managerialist” interventions,210 the EEOC’s settlements
reached under GINA appear to be more ambitious. First, the EEOC has aggressively pursued claims related to family medical histories.211 Second, the EEOC
has also sought and recovered damages for requests for genetic information even
where there is no corresponding claim of discrimination.212 Finally, the EEOC

Id. at 101-03; EEOC v. Cummins Power Generation Inc., No. 14-CV-3408, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 184407 (D. Minn. May 6, 2016) (consent decree).
209. No. 13-CV-6250, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81439 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2014).
210. Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1525-27 (2014).
211. See BNV Home Care Agency to Pay $125,000 to Settle EEOC Genetic Discrimination Lawsuit, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/newsroom/release/11-1-16a.cfm [https://perma.cc/73AV-RTAH] [hereinafter BNV Home
Care Agency] (settling a matter in which a company impermissibly asked for family medical
histories); Fabricut to Pay $50,000 to Settle EEOC Disability and Genetic Information Discrimination Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (May 7, 2013), https://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-7-13b.cfm [https://perma.cc/56MA-VTDD] (settling a matter in which a company impermissibly asked for its employee’s family medical history regarding “heart disease, hypertension, cancer, tuberculosis, diabetes, arthritis and ‘mental disorders’”); Guardsmark Settles EEOC Disability & Genetic Information Discrimination Cases for
$329,640, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (June 23, 2016), https://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-23-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/LY3R-LRC7] (settling a matter
in which a company required applicants to complete questionnaires with questions pertaining
to their family medical history); Joy Mining Machinery Settles EEOC Genetic Information NonDiscrimination Act Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-7-16.cfm
[https://perma.cc/K4MT
-QRMV] (settling a matter in which a company impermissibly asked applicants if they had a
family medical history of “TB, Cancer, Diabetes, Epilepsy, [and] Heart Disease”).
212. See Founders Pavilion Will Pay $370,000 to Settle EEOC Genetic Information Discrimination Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/newsroom/release/1-13-14.cfm [https://perma.cc/LAL2-96TY] [hereinafter Founders Pavilion] (requiring a payment fund for people whose genetic information was improperly solicited); Seed and Fertilizer Providers to Pay $187,500 for Genetic Information and Disability Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/newsroom/release/11-10-14.cfm [https://perma.cc/K8YH-8TSX] (settling for nearly
$200,000, the majority of which went to four applicants whose genetic information was improperly solicited) [hereinafter All Star Seed]; see also BNV Home Care Agency, supra note 211
(“Employers should take heed of this settlement, because there are tangible consequences to
unlawfully asking employees and applicants about their family medical history.”).
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has more procedural latitude to aggregate claims than do private litigants,213 and
it has recently had success in settling class actions under GINA.214
Reading the favorable GINA cases together reveals that although GINA has
not been used to defend against discrimination based on genetic-test results, it
has provided employees relief when employers seek genetic data, particularly in
the form of family medical history. Thus, GINA’s most valuable provisions have
been secondary to its legislative purpose to increase genetic testing. The statute
has thus succeeded in unexpected ways.

ev

iii. gina’s legacy
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Having reflected on GINA’s first decade, we now turn to GINA’s future. As
described above, GINA’s greatest observable contribution has been as a safeguard against employer prying. Robust protections for employee privacy are
more important now than ever before, as employees are particularly vulnerable
to employer snooping in a world of big data. At present, employees have little
meaningful protection for their privacy at work. GINA therefore offers a unique
and valuable protection. Although not conceived as a big-data privacy statute,
GINA safeguards a rich source of information that employers could otherwise
mine.
GINA’s unexpected second life as a privacy statute both demonstrates the
need for greater protections for employee privacy and provides a blueprint for
structuring those protections. This Part begins by arguing that GINA provides
novel protection against data mining in the workplace. It then turns to the benefits of enacting GINA-like protections for other forms of sensitive employee
data. Finally, we reflect on the normative implications of our findings.
A. Modern Privacy Landscape in a World of Big Data

rin

tn

Many of the cases from Part II show that employers want access to their employees’ data. Read together, these lawsuits demonstrate that employers are interested in employee data throughout the duration of the employment relationship. They want access to information about their employees to make hiring

Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 463-64 (2007)
(observing that under various employment discrimination statutes “the EEOC and DOJ have
far more procedural breathing room to pursue class-type relief than private litigants.”).
214. See All Star Seed, supra note 212 (settling a matter on behalf of a class of job applicants who
were subjected to illegal medical and genetic-information inquiries); BNV Home Care Agency,
supra note 211 (same); Founders Pavilion, supra note 212 (settling first-ever class action lawsuit
alleging genetic discrimination).
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decisions, assess fitness for duty, improve wellness, decrease costs, and regulate
employee conduct.
1. Big Data and the Threat to Employee Privacy

Here we outline why employers feel employee data is valuable, how big data
compounds existing threats to privacy, and the ways in which employers could
use big data to monitor their employees.

ev

a. The Value of Employee Data
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Consider the example of Humanyze from the Introduction. Employers have
many reasons for wanting information about their employees. Most private employers care primarily about their bottom lines.215 They want to maximize
productivity while minimizing costs, and workers can cost their employers
money in a variety of ways. They may waste valuable work hours using social
media sites, chatting with coworkers, taking smoke breaks, or browsing the internet. They may not come in at all for health reasons or to fulfill family obligations. They may raise insurance or operating costs because of illness or injury.
As a result, employers may be very interested in learning which employees are
distracted or feeling stressed, which employees plan to get pregnant, or which
employees are susceptible to disease or injury—to name just a few possibilities.
Additionally, tracking communication and movement can let an employer know
if departments are not working together or if space is being underutilized.216
Having access to this kind of information allows employers to make more informed decisions about whom to hire, whom to fire, and whom to promote to
ensure a workforce that is as productive and low cost as possible.
Importantly, the desired information need not have anything to do with the
employee’s ability to perform the job. Take, for example, off-duty smoking. A
potential employee may have excellent credentials, relevant experience, and
highly developed skills. She may only smoke in the privacy of her home and her
habit could have no meaningful impact on her ability to perform her job. Nevertheless, some employers will not hire that candidate for reasons related to insurance costs or even animus.217 In these cases, whether an employee smokes has

See Sharona Hoffman, Citizen Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical Big Data,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1741, 1774 (2015) (explaining that “[e]mployers go to great lengths to
select employees carefully in order to maximize business productivity and profitability.”).
216. See There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1.
217. See JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 7, 33-34, 42, 115-16, 184 (2018).
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nothing to do with qualifications, ability, or job performance. Thus, a wide range
of private information—not just conduct or attributes that affect whether a person can work—may be of interest to employers.
b. Big Data as a Growing Threat to Privacy

218.
219.
220.

See Ajunwa et al., supra note 77, at 738 (arguing that advances in the ability to monitor employees have “moved in lockstep with the advancement of technological capacities”).
See id. at 742-43, 769; There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1.
See Ajunwa et al., supra note 77, at 763-66.
There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1.
Hoffman, supra note 215, at 1775 (“Many employers reportedly access public profiles that applicants post on social media sites as part of their investigation of candidates’ credentials. They
also ask applicants for permission to obtain their credit reports.”).
See The Big Data Conundrum: How to Define It?, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www
.technologyreview.com/s/519851/the-big-data-conundrum-how-to-define-it
[https://
perma.cc/F76S-VUUM] (discussing a survey of different definitions of “big data” provided

rin

221.

tn

ot

pe

er
r

ev

In the digital age, employees are particularly vulnerable to employer surveillance. Certainly, the degree of employee surveillance by Humanyze is extreme,
but even more conventional employers may wish to track their workers. Employers have a vested interest in monitoring the private lives of their employees,
and new technologies and big data give employers more access than ever before
to information.218
Employers have a variety of surveillance tools already at their disposal. First,
employers can use productivity apps and software to monitor their workers. Employers can track when employees view a document, access the internet, read
emails, and log on to social media.219 Second, employers can collect information
on physical health and activity. Wellness programs may include biometric
screenings, health-risk-assessment questionnaires, and fitness-tracking devices
like FitBits.220 Amazon recently patented wristbands for its employees that could
track their locations and hand movements to allow the company to monitor its
workers’ accuracy and productivity in real time.221 Finally, employers can obtain
sensitive employee information like social media profiles and credit reports.222
Employers today have potential access to an unprecedented amount of information about their employees.
If all these individual sources were not enough, big data compounds the
threats to employee privacy. While there is no uniformly accepted definition of
“big data,” it typically refers to a high-volume dataset that, although too large
for traditional databases and analytical tools, can be analyzed using algorithms
or other computational methods.223 One quality that makes big data unique is

222.
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its ability to reveal trends, patterns, and relationships that would go unnoticed
using more conventional models.224 It provides the opportunity to cross-reference datasets and to access even more intimate information. In a particularly
provocative and unsettling example of what big data can achieve, the Target Corporation famously revealed that a teenager was pregnant before she told her parents.225 An angry man stormed into the retailer demanding to know why Target
had started sending mailers featuring baby clothes and cribs to his high-schoolage daughter. It turned out that the corporation had accurately predicted the
young woman might be expecting a child, using data analytics to identify purchasing patterns of the women on its baby registries. Target learned that pregnant women buy certain products, like supplements and unscented lotion, at
varying points in their pregnancies. The corporation had taken the algorithms it
developed based on those patterns and applied them to its database of customers.226 In fact, Target could have even told the outraged father his daughter’s
approximate due date.227 Big-data analysis means that what seems like a simple
visit to Target can reveal intimate information about a person’s reproductive
choices—information she may not yet have shared with her family and friends.
In another example of big data revealing intimate information, a recent study
reported that social media giant Facebook—which recently came under attack for
its lax privacy protections228—can infer a user’s sexual orientation, even if she
has not openly disclosed that orientation on her profile.229 The algorithm uses

225.

ot
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226.

tn

224.

by high-tech organizations); see also, e.g., Big Data, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed.
2008) (“[D]ata of a very large size, typically to the extent that its manipulation and management present significant logistical challenges . . . .”); James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next
Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. 1 (2011),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/McKinsey
%20Digital/Our%20Insights/Big%20data%20The%20next%20frontier%20for
%20innovation/MGI_big_data_full_report.ashx
[https://perma.cc/DBN7-C8U8]
(“[D]atasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture,
store, manage, and analyze.”).
See Dalim Basu & Jon G. Hall, Big Data, Big Opportunities, in BIG DATA: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES 46, 48-51 (2014).
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc
/2XZM-LTKP].
Id.
Id.
See Class Action Complaint at 3-4, Price v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01732, 2018 WL
1404892 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (alleging that Facebook permitted Cambridge Analytica to
gather personal information about its members without their permission).
See Daizhuo Chen et al., Enhancing Transparency and Control When Drawing Data-Driven Inferences About Individuals, 5 BIG DATA 197, 198, 203 (2017).
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“Likes” for certain activities, musical artists, books and TV shows—dancing,
Katy Perry, Harry Potter, and True Blood, for example—to predict whether the
user might identify as LGBTQ. Facebook could then sell that information to advertisers who want to reach LGBTQ users.
In the same way that Facebook “Likes” can predict sexual orientation, big
data can also be used to predict divorce and insurance risk. Using credit card
purchase data, companies like Visa can forecast divorce rates. These predictions
in turn allow them to determine future potential credit problems, as people going through a divorce are more likely to miss payments.230 Insurers likewise use
big data to gain additional information about their insureds, such as using credit
scores to infer risk.231
c. Big Data in Employment

231.

rin

232.

See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE
SMART 34, 179 (2007) (describing the allegation that Visa uses credit card purchases to predict
divorce).
Darcy Steeg Morris et al., Do Credit-Based Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Auto
Claim Risk?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 397 (2017).
See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 215, at 1775 (“It is also possible that employers will hire data
miners to re-identify medical information when doing so is not excessively difficult.”).
See Sharona Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 777,
777 (2017) (arguing that employers can gather “[i]nformation about workers’ habits, behaviors, or attributes that is derived from big data” and that such information “can be used to
create profiles of undesirable employees”).
There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1.
Id.
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Employers are capable of harnessing the power of big data. They can hire
data miners to aggregate and analyze information beyond what they learn from
productivity apps, wellness data, and requests for information to gain a peek into
the private lives of their employees.232 Employers are already gathering information about their employees that they could then use to profile and flag potentially costly or otherwise undesirable workers.233 For example, Microsoft has a
program that analyzes data from emails, calendars, and other sources to allow
employees to assess whether they are using their time efficiently.234 Managers
also have access to that information but only in aggregated form.235
The potential information available to employers about their workers is not
confined to the workplace. Employers could take the information that they already have and gain additional insights about employees’ health, reproductive
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Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big Data to Track Employee Pregnancies, FORTUNE
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/castlight-pregnancy-data [https://perma.cc
/E7Y2-JBK3].
237. Lindsey J. Smith, Big Data Knows if You’re Pregnant, VERGE (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www
.theverge.com/2016/2/17/11032606/big-data-employers-health-info
[https://perma.cc
/9EDX-Z57D].
238. Zarya, supra note 236.
239. Id.
240. See There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1.
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choices, relationships, and other aspects of their private lives by using big data.
For example, health-care-analytics company Castlight made headlines in 2016
when it advertised services including being able to predict whether employees
were pregnant or trying to conceive.236 The algorithm uses factors like a female
employee’s age, whether she has stopped filling a birth control prescription, and
any fertility-related queries on her health application to determine the likelihood
she may have a baby.237 Thankfully, Castlight stated that it would return aggregated (not individualized) data to its clients, share only the number of employees
without their names, and not provide information about a group of fewer than
forty people.238 But these restrictions are company-imposed policy designed to
protect privacy and its public image. No law prevents Castlight from giving the
names of potentially pregnant employees to its clients.239
Pregnancy is not the only intimate kind of information that might be revealed if employers use big data to pry. Say an employee has a family medical
history of Huntington’s disease, a debilitating neurological condition that may
come on at middle age, and her employer contracts with a health insurer that
offers big-data analytics as part of its services. To search for providers covered
by the health insurer, employees must log on with their names and policy information. The website then keeps a record of their searches. If, when the employee
starts experiencing the early warning signs of Huntington’s, the employee logs
on to look for neurologists, the data-analytics firm could easily take her family
medical history and cross-reference it with her age and web searches to determine that she has active Huntington’s disease. In fact, the employer might know
that the employee is sick even before she herself knows. While health plans do
not currently offer such services to employers, the Castlight example demonstrates that this kind of data mining is certainly possible.
Beyond physical health, employers can also peer into their employees’ sense
of well-being and interpersonal relationships. In Japan, keeping employees
happy and productive is a serious area of concern for employers.240 One Japanese
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2. Non-GINA Protections for Employee Privacy

ev

company, Hitachi, markets a “happiness meter” to employers that uses an algorithm to assess its employees’ moods based on their physical movement.241 An
American firm, Veriato, offers a service that, among other things, scans emails to
determine how employees’ feelings are changing over time.242 Additionally, an
employer with access to its employees’ social media profiles, emails, internet
searches, and financial histories could—in the spirit of Facebook and creditors—
learn about their intimate interpersonal relationships. For example, divorce is
one of life’s most notoriously disruptive events.243 An employer might thus be
interested in learning if its employees’ marriages are on the rocks because that
added stress could very well affect job performance.

a. Workplace Privacy Law

er
r

While much of this conduct goes unregulated,244 employers do not have unfettered access to employee information. In particular, privacy statutes and laws
governing disability restrict access to certain kinds of employee information.245

pe

Certain statutes directly protect employees from invasions of privacy. While
there is no federal law that broadly shields workers from snooping by their employers, the Privacy Act of 1974 regulates how federal agencies and their contractors collect, maintain, use, and disseminate information about individuals, including when the covered entities are acting as employers.246 The Electronic
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Id.
Id.
Thomas H. Holmes & Richard H. Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 11 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 213, 216 (1967).
See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (2015) (arguing that “[s]ensitive information laws can and should do more work”); see also There Will Be Little Privacy,
supra note 1 (explaining that “[m]ost employment contracts in America give employers blanket rights to monitor employees and collect data about them”).
See Hoffman, supra note 215, at 1774 (“Employers may have good economic reasons to strive
for the healthiest possible workforce, but they are constrained by federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination based on a variety of protected classifications, including disability and
genetic information.”).
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); see also Workplace Monitoring Laws, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT.,
https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/employee-relations
/Documents/State%20surveillance%20and%20monitoring%20laws.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BRE6-HUG6] (listing state statutes that regulate employers’ monitoring of their employees).
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Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) prevents eavesdropping by employers
when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.247 However, two key exceptions limit the reach of that statute. The law permits employer monitoring in the
ordinary course of business248 and with the employee’s consent.249 Hence, scouring emails in the name of productivity—especially if employees have agreed to
monitoring as a term of their employment—would not violate the statute. In
fact, the consent exception does not require that the communication being monitored relate to employment.250 Further, most employer monitoring of emails
will not meet the ECPA’s definition of “intercept,” which requires that the surveillance occur at the actual time that the email is sent.251 Federal law, therefore,
enables employers to read their employees’ personal emails, as long as the employers obtain the requisite consent, or they access the email on a server after
transmission. Most states also have laws that prohibit eavesdropping and secret
recordings, which may apply to employers.252 Of course, much like with the
ECPA, an employer will not violate most of these laws as long as it conducts
surveillance by means of a server or the employee knows that she is under surveillance.
Certain states have enacted laws protecting employee privacy with respect to
social media and biometric screening. Social media privacy statutes prevent employers from requiring their employees or applicants to provide passwords to
their private online accounts.253 Additionally, at least three states—Illinois,
Texas, and Washington—have passed laws governing the collection, use, and
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See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511 (2018) (prohibiting the interception of a person’s communications
but providing a defense for consent, under which no reasonable expectation of privacy would
exist).
Id. § 2510(5)(a).
Id. § 2511(2)(d).
See Managing Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Feb.
18, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/toolkits/pages
/workplaceprivacy.aspx.
See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that “every
circuit court to have considered the matter has held that an ‘intercept’ under the ECPA must
occur contemporaneously with transmission” and thus, there can be no “intercept” of an email
in storage).
See Workplace Monitoring Laws, supra note 246.
See State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www
.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting
-access-to-social-media-usernames-and-passwords.aspx [https://perma.cc/ST6A-A9YN].
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b. Americans with Disabilities Act
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storage of biometric data of consumers, as well as employees.254 The Illinois statute, which includes a private right of action, has resulted in a stream of litigation
with more than fifty companies having faced lawsuits as of 2018.255 The other
two laws do not allow individuals to sue.256 Still, employers may monitor their
employees’ internet use at work, including their use of social media during work
hours.
Finally, state statutes, many of which predate GINA, safeguard workers’ genetic privacy.257 Almost three-quarters of states have genetic-specific employment protections and over half of states prohibit employers from requiring that
their employees submit to genetic testing.258 These statutes have had an extremely limited impact. In fact, at the time GINA passed, no state lawsuit had
ever been reported.259

pe

The ADA offers some limited protection against employer snooping related
to disability. What an employer can lawfully ask an employee depends on when
that inquiry takes place: preoffer, postoffer, or during employment. Preoffer, a
covered employer may ask applicants about their ability to perform job-related
functions but it cannot make disability-related inquiries or request medical exams.260 Postoffer, not only can the employer require that prospective employees
undergo medical exams, it can also request their health records, so long as it does
not target individual employees, keeps the information confidential, and does
not use the data to discriminate on the basis of disability.261 Finally, after em-

Erin Marine, Biometric Privacy Laws: Illinois and the Fight Against Intrusive Tech, FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2018), https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/03/20
/biometric-privacy-laws-illinois-and-the-fight-against-intrusive-tech
[https://perma.cc
/7H6K-WB5E].
255. Id.
256. Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois Cousin, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (July 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/washington-biometric-privacy-n73014461920
[https://perma.cc/ECA8-39HJ].
257. Rothstein, supra note 30, at 175.
258. See Bloomberg Law, State Chart on Genetic Information Bias in Employment (unpublished
data) (on file with authors).
259. Kim, supra note 160, at 696.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2018).
261. Id. § 12112(d)(3) (“A covered entity may require a medical examination after an offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement of the employment duties of such applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on the results of
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ployment has begun, employers can only order medical exams or make disability-related inquiries when the information sought is “job-related and consistent
with business necessity.”262 Of course, in the age of big data, when employers
can access information through a variety of sources other than medical examinations and inquiries, the ADA’s privacy protections look obsolete.263
B. GINA as a Blueprint for Employee-Privacy Protection

er
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ev

We now turn to GINA’s unique contributions and to its shortcomings. The
statute’s greatest success has been in barring employers from accessing certain
kinds of sensitive information. This is privacy by design.264 However, the desire
for employee data is not restricted to genetic information. As noted, employers
may also have an interest in information about health risks, relationships, or
even reproductive choices. As such, GINA’s success as a protection for employee
privacy can serve as a blueprint for additional protections both for recognized
antidiscrimination classes and for other sensitive employee data.
1. Genetic-Information Nondiscrimination

ot

pe

Given that current workplace privacy laws and the ADA leave workers largely
unprotected from employer surveillance, GINA is far more promising as a protection for employee privacy. Its prohibition on obtaining genetic information
helpfully prevents employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetictest results of both employees and their family members. The hypothetical example of the employee with Huntington’s disease demonstrates that genetic data
is exactly the kind of rich information source that could be mined using big-data
analytics.265
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such examination, if – (A) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of disability; (B) information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of
the applicant is . . . treated as a confidential medical record . . . .”).
Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
For an excellent discussion of the ADA’s shortfalls when it comes to big data, see Hoffman,
supra note 233, at 786-88.
Cf. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT (2018) (arguing that privacy is best effectuated through improving the design of popular technologies).
See Rothstein, supra note 68, at 6 (“Precision medicine promises to utilize genomic data in
combination with diverse ‘big data’ sources, such as data from exposures, mobile devices and
health apps, wearable devices, consumer transactions, geolocation logs, and numerous other
publicly and privately available data sources. Computer algorithms will then calculate health
risks or other end points.”).
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Of course, as noted in Part II, GINA does not forbid all acquisitions of genetic information.266 The wellness-program and toxic-monitoring provisions, in
particular, may give employers further access to employee data that they can then
mine. However, the statute limits the conditions under which employers can acquire genetic information. Both exceptions require that the employee give “prior,
knowing, voluntary, and written authorization”267 and that the employer only
receives the genetic information “in aggregate terms that do not disclose the
identity of specific employees.”268 Thus, GINA restricts substantially the conditions under which employers can lawfully obtain their employees’ genetic data.
Importantly, none of the reasons an employer might desire to mine data
about its employees appears to fall within GINA’s exceptions. Actively acquiring
genetic data to mine is not inadvertent. It does not relate to providing health
services, applying for leave, monitoring toxic substances, or quality control in
law enforcement. The most likely candidate for an applicable exception is purchasing commercially and publicly available documents, yet even that provision
seems unlikely to shield snoopy employers from liability. The exception states
that an employer does not unlawfully obtain genetic information “where an employer purchases documents that are commercially and publicly available (including newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and books, but not including medical databases or court records) that include family medical history.”269 Thus, the
exception appears to apply only to documents that inadvertently contain genetic
information. None of GINA’s exceptions appears to provide employers with a
pathway for obtaining genetic data.
Consider the Huntington’s example. A third party has access to an employee’s family medical history as part of the datasets that it cross-references to
gain predictive information, which it then passes to the employer. In such a scenario, the employer could incur legal liability under GINA if it pays a data-analytics company to mine its employees’ data, because the employer is effectively
purchasing genetic information as part of the company’s services.270 Of course,
the data-analytics firm could redact all genetic information from its reports to

See supra note 72 and accompanying text (detailing exceptions).
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202(b)(5)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1
(b)(5)(B)(i) (2018). However, if federal or state law requires the genetic monitoring, the employer does not need authorization. Id. § 202(b)(5)(B)(ii).
268. Id. § 202(b)(2)(D), (b)(5)(E).
269. Id. § 202(b)(4).
270. Cf. Lee v. City of Moraine Fire Dep’t, No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 3, 2015) (finding an employer liable under GINA for the behavior of a physician who was
said to be an “agent” of the employer).
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ensure that its clients do not run afoul of the statute. But depending on the nature of the predictive information that the company discloses, employers purchasing even redacted reports might violate GINA. The results of the data analytics—while not technically genetic information under the statute—may pertain
to genetic risk and are thus only a small step removed from the letter of the law.
GINA could possibly offer protection in the future against the acquisition and
subsequent mining of genetic data.271
2. Lessons from GINA’s First Ten Years

a. Lack of Awareness
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One starting point for thinking about GINA as a blueprint for other privacy
protections is to consider GINA’s shortcomings to date—and what, if anything,
might be done about them. Reflecting on GINA’s first decade provides the opportunity to reassess some of the criticisms of the statute’s usefulness. Drawing
from our case review in Part II, we offer some prescriptive insights regarding
how courts and other policy stakeholders should proceed on GINA.

Other discrimination laws have been interpreted over time to broaden the scope of the protected trait. This is especially the case when the broadening promotes the spirit or values of
an underlying law. Perhaps the best example is Title VII’s protection of “sex,” which has been
broadened over the decades to encompass gender nonconformance, sexual stereotyping, and
transgender status. See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW
(2016) (discussing the evolution of U.S. sex discrimination jurisprudence during the twentyfirst century); Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1085, 1087-88
(2017). More recently, some courts have even found that gay and lesbian individuals may be
per se covered under “sex”—and not just when they tie discrimination to their performative
defiance of gender norms. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en
banc); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). In much the
same way, interpreting GINA broadly to address data analytics that pertain to genetic risk
might be seen as furthering two of the law’s values: (1) the prevention of an underclass and
(2) privacy.
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Given the lack of awareness about GINA, there must be a greater focus on
educating the public. The EEOC and Department of Health and Human Services
should implement a dedicated public-relations campaign to educate the public
about GINA’s varied protections. More sweeping judicial interpretations or
amendments will matter little if the general public does not know about the statute.
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b. Limited Scope
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There is also a need for public education about the nature of genomic risk,272
which is a pronounced concern as more commercial DNA tests are coming to
market. For example, take the recent FDA-approved DNA test for
BRCA1/BRCA2 genetic mutations. Merely testing positive for one of several
BRCA1/BRCA2 breast-cancer gene mutations does not provide definitive information about the risk of developing breast cancer, and “most BRCA mutations
that increase an individual’s risk are not detected by this [new direct-to-consumer] test.”273 Further, “most cases of cancer are not caused by hereditary gene
mutations but are thought to be caused by a wide variety of factors, including
smoking, obesity, hormone use and other lifestyle issues.”274 All of this means
that even something as seemingly straightforward as testing for breast-cancer
gene mutations can contain many complications and uncertainties in forecasting
risk.
Ensuring that potential litigants, health-care providers, employers, the employment bar, and the judiciary have at least some familiarity with GINA and its
protections, as well as with genetic risk in general, is essential for GINA’s future.
Health-care providers and employers must understand the law to comply with
it. Lawyers and the public should be able to identify potential GINA violations
when they arise to bring cases. Judges must properly apply the statute, and not
read in their own meaning. All of these things require greater awareness.

Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW & INEQ. 429
(2007).
273. FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that Reports Three Mutations in
the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.fda
.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm599560.htm
[https://perma.cc
/4GBJ-CS7N].
274. Id.
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As discussed above, GINA has also faced criticism for its limited scope. Employers and health insurers are not the only ones who may have an interest in
obtaining and acting on genetic data. One can imagine the common fact patterns
from the GINA cases playing out in other settings. For example, the case of the
devious defecator could well have occurred at a public middle school. In many
states, nothing would stop the school district from requiring minors to provide
genetic data. Perhaps, then, we should think more broadly about other threats
and expand GINA’s scope. While augmenting GINA’s reach might be a commendable goal, expanding the statute to other spheres is unlikely to garner the
requisite congressional support. GINA took thirteen years to pass and was the
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result of compromise on the part of lawmakers to appease various stakeholders,
including researchers, employers, the insurance industry, and individuals at genetic risk.275 In the current climate of political divisiveness, common ground is
even harder to come by.276 Thus, any expansion beyond GINA’s current purview
is most likely to happen via individual state laws, like CalGINA, and not a broad
congressional mandate.277
c. Narrow Protected Status
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Another source of criticism, which our case study bears out, has been GINA’s
narrow protected status. Although family medical history has been interpreted
robustly and represents a broadly remedial edge to GINA’s protections,278 some
courts have already begun interpreting genetic information stringently—a move
that has parallels in protected class gatekeeping, which scholars have observed at
times under all of the employment discrimination statutes.279 While the definition of genetic information is incredibly specific, courts should interpret its
meaning broadly.
As explained in Part II, Poore and Conner-Goodgame require that genetic information be predictive or communicate actual medical risk.280 This narrow application—for example, to exclude allegations of discrimination that stem from
an employee’s wife’s MS or a mother’s HIV—is needlessly restrictive. If the employer discriminated because it thought a wife’s MS or a mother’s HIV might
relate to an employee’s health—even if the employer is mistaken—GINA ought
to provide recourse. This argument is akin to the ADA’s protections, which de-

Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (explaining that GINA itself was a compromise because “[a]
broader bill would have been extremely unlikely to get the necessary support in Congress”).
276. Carl Hulse, Sharper State Divide in Congress Seen as ‘New Civil War,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/us/politics/hulse-congress-tax-cut-campaigns.html
[https://perma.cc/L2A5-4226].
277. Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (“Although there has been some movement at the state level,
notably California’s adding genetic information to the prohibitions of the state civil rights
laws, the prospect of future Congressional action seems remote.”).
278. See supra Section II.C (discussing the success of GINA as a privacy protection).
279. See Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 101 (2017) (arguing
that “protected class gatekeeping is grounded in dubious constructions of antidiscrimination
statutes, and that its routine use prevents equality law from achieving its central aim: dismantling sexism, racism, homophobia, religious intolerance, and other such biases”); see also, e.g.,
Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the Medical Model
of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 209-25 (2008) (detailing a variety of
ways in which federal courts keep ADA plaintiffs out of court).
280. Supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
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3. Taking a Cue from GINA
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fine the protected class to include those who are “regarded as” disabled.281 The
argument to protect information that does not communicate actual risk is also
supported by the EEOC’s regulations, which define family members to include
dependents by marriage and adoption.282 Such an expansive interpretation
would also answer the call of scholars who have observed the ADA’s deficiencies
in failing to protect people who are perceived as likely to develop mental or physical impairments in the future.283 Of course, if an employee can no longer adequately perform her job, it would not be discrimination under either statute for
the employer to take an adverse action.
Further, protecting the plaintiffs in Poore and Conner-Goodgame is sensible
from the perspective of giving plaintiffs associational protections that relate to
genetic information. Courts have allowed both Title VII and ADA plaintiffs to
bring claims based on their association with members of the protected class.284
The same logic could be applied to the genetic context as well. In sum, genetic
information should be interpreted by courts in a way that captures the spirit of
GINA. Much like the court declared in Lowe v. Atlas Logistics, genetic information
ought to be given a plain, nontechnical meaning that confers a broadly remedial
impact.285 Such an interpretation would lay the groundwork to flexibly apply
GINA to areas of innovation, such as big data, as well as other areas that have
not yet arisen.

ot

A broad employee-privacy statute presents several challenges for lawmakers.
First and foremost, what should be the scope of such a protection? GINA’s potential as a blueprint for a big-data privacy statute can be understood in at least
two different ways. On one hand, the ban on requesting, requiring, and purchas-

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(c) (2018).
29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a)(1) (2018).
283. Professor Sharona Hoffman has argued that, in the era of big data, Congress should amend
the ADA “to protect individuals who might be categorized as likely to develop physical or
mental impairments in the future.” Hoffman, supra note 233, at 777.
284. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (defining discrimination to include “excluding or otherwise
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an
individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association”); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892-93 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that discrimination because of an interracial marriage or interracial association was
discrimination based on race); Barker v. Int’l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 15-16 (D. Me. 1998)
(holding that a nondisabled employee set forth an ADA retaliation claim by claiming he was
fired for seeking accommodation for his disabled wife).
285. 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
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ing genetic data is a prohibition on collecting information that relates to a recognized antidiscrimination category—genetic information. On the other,
GINA’s privacy provision restricts access to a particular type of private health
information. Both readings could provide a model for future lawmaking.
a. Protecting Recognized Antidiscrimination Classes
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While federal employment discrimination law prohibits discrimination
based on race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, and genetic
information, GINA is the only statute to broadly ban requesting, requiring, or
purchasing information related to the protected status. Thus, these other protected statuses are more vulnerable to employer prying, particularly in the era of
big data. We can return to the pregnancy example. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to outlaw discrimination
against pregnant workers. However, nothing in that law stops employers from
requesting, requiring, or purchasing information about their employees’ potential pregnancies. Likewise, the ADA does not stop employers from obtaining information related to disability, so long as the employers are not conducting medical exams or making disability-related inquiries. Employers could therefore use
big data to legally obtain all kinds of sensitive information about their employees, even information that relates to statuses protected by employment discrimination laws.
Taking a cue from GINA, Congress or states could pass laws that similarly
prohibit employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing employee information that pertains to a protected antidiscrimination category. For example,
lawmakers could amend Title VII and the ADA to include GINA-like privacy
provisions. Those amendments would prevent employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing information related to a protected status. These protections would, by consequence, prohibit employers from mining that data.
Adding GINA-like privacy protections could also serve the antidiscrimination goals of those preexisting laws. Employers who mine data in an attempt to
reduce costs may further disadvantage historically subordinated groups. Consider again the pregnancy example. Once an employer knows that at least forty
of its employees are pregnant or trying, all women of reproductive age may become suspect.286 The employer may then—either consciously or because of implicit bias—opt not to hire or promote women of reproductive age out of the

Stephanie R. Morain et al., What to Expect When [Your Employer Suspects] You’re Expecting,
176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1597, 1597-98 (2016).
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b. Protecting Sensitive Information

ev

concern that they may impose costs by filing insurance claims and taking parental leave,287 thus further disadvantaging a historically subjugated group. This
conduct would, of course, violate the PDA. However, discrimination, particularly when it results from unconscious thinking, is notoriously hard to establish.288 Preventing employers from acquiring information that relates to a protected status could deny employers access to the very information they would,
and do, use to discriminate.289 Thus, amending existing employment discrimination statutes to safeguard privacy also serves those laws’ antidiscrimination
ends.

er
r

While amending existing antidiscrimination laws is one path forward, employers want intimate information that falls outside the scope of those laws. Examples could include an employee’s sexual orientation,290 political affiliation,291
nongenetic health risks,292 or socioeconomic class.293 Alternatively, instead of
Id. at 1598.
288. As the Seventh Circuit stated decades ago, “Proof of . . . discrimination is always difficult.
Defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor
leave a paper trail demonstrating it; and because most employment decisions involve some
discretion, alternative hypotheses (including that of simple mistake) will always be possible
and often plausible.” Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987). Studies have
shown that employment discrimination plaintiffs have lower success rates than plaintiffs in
other domains when it comes to settlement, pretrial adjudication, and trial. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to
Worse, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131 (2009).
289. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2121-22.
290. While formally there is no federal statutory protection for sexual orientation, many states and
municipalities prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. See State Laws on Employment-Related Discrimination, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research
/labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment.aspx [https://perma.cc/EV44-A8QS].
Additionally, two federal circuit courts have recently held that gay and lesbian individuals are
always covered under “sex”—and not just when they tie discrimination to their performative
defiance of gender norms. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en
banc); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Nevertheless,
most circuit courts have held that sexual orientation is not covered under Title VII’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination.
291. While public employers may not discriminate based on political affiliation, private employers
are generally not subject to the same kinds of constraints. See 10 LEX. K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION ch. 171 (2d ed. 2011).
292. See generally ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 217.
293. While there is no general protection against socioeconomic-status discrimination, a few laws
have been passed at the state level to ban discrimination against those with poor credit.
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looking to antidiscrimination statutes and historically subordinated groups, legislators could regulate employers’ access to different sorts of information. GINA
is unlike other antidiscrimination statutes because the status it protects is not a
widely accepted, lived social category.294 GINA can therefore be understood not
as protecting an attribute or a class of people but rather as protecting certain
kinds of information, mainly genetic-test results and family medical history.
Thus, another way to structure a GINA-like protection for employee privacy
would be to forbid access to certain kinds of employee data.
The benefit of this model would extend beyond traditional antidiscrimination categories to provide more comprehensive protection for all employees. It
would not matter if the data mining pertains to a protected status, just that it
involves potentially sensitive information. For instance, whether Title VII forbids discrimination because of sexual orientation is an unresolved question.295
Amending Title VII to protect sexual orientation as a recognized class might still
allow employers to use data analytics to acquire that information. However, if
the law forbids access to social media profiles and browser histories, the employer could not derive inferences about an employee’s sexuality from social media regardless of how courts resolve the question of whether Title VII protects
sexual orientation. This strategy has the added benefit of avoiding identity politics and protected class gatekeeping,296 while also subverting the potential for
discrimination.
Legislators could define the parameters of an employee-privacy statute in at
least a couple different ways. First, they could limit employer access to certain
types of data. Protected categories might include information that pertains to recognized zones of privacy (including medical treatment and intimate relationships). Such a legal protection would require creating an enumerated list, thus
leaving information not captured in those categories unprotected. Another strat-
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Heather Morton, Use of Credit Information in Employment: 2015 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (June 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and
-commerce/use-of-credit-information-in-employment-2015-legislation.aspx
[https://
perma.cc/T2PX-FPYU] (documenting the states that have introduced or passed legislation
barring the use of credit information in hiring). Nevertheless, a compelling case can be made
for extending the discrimination laws to socioeconomic-status discrimination. See Danieli
Evans Peterman, Socioeconomic Status Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1283 (2018).
294. Roberts, supra note 61, at 623.
295. See supra note 290.
296. See Clarke, supra note 279, at 103, 119 nn.115-16 and accompanying text (describing the phenomenon of courts refusing to consider discrimination claims from individuals who are not
members of protected classes where the alleged discrimination derived from their wrongly
perceived membership in such classes).
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egy might simply be to limit employer access to information that does not pertain to employment. Recall that once employment has begun, the ADA does not
permit medical examinations or disability-related inquiries unless they are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. Likewise, some states prohibit
monitoring or retaliating against employees’ lawful conduct away from work.297
A privacy law could forbid employers from seeking out information about their
employees that is neither relevant nor necessary for the business.
Another possible strategy for protecting employee privacy would be to limit
employer access to sources of potentially sensitive data, such as social media activity, internet queries, and fitness-tracking devices. A statute could then target
any employer surveillance unrelated to work as a general matter.298 Some states
already have laws that stop employers from accessing employees’ social media
profiles.299 Of course, the line between regulating the type of information and
regulating access to its source can at times collapse. GINA, for example, prevents
employers from obtaining a type of data—genetic information—but defines that
type of data in part by referring to a source—genetic tests. These distinctions are
not perfect. Instead, they are examples of possible strategies for approaching the
issue of employee privacy.
4. Counterarguments and Qualifications

pe

GINA offers a promising template for employment laws of the future. Yet it
is not without its shortcomings. Here we respond to potential criticisms of
adopting GINA-like protections to protect against employer prying.

ot

a. Benefits of Disclosure

See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96(k), 98.6 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5
(West 2015); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (West
2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.333 (LexisNexis 2012); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-28.2
(West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2018).
298. For such a proposal, see Ajunwa et al., supra note 77, at 774-75.
299. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (Supp. 2017); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West Supp. 2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 8-2-127 (West Supp. 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-6 (West. Supp.
2018).

Pr

ep

rin

297.

tn

The first critique is that both employers and employees could possibly benefit from the information that these protections would shield. Information about
protected classes like race, religion, and disability is what allow employers to en-
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300.
301.
302.

See Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 272 (arguing for an equitable legal regime in which genetic
differences are recognized rather than ignored).
See Areheart, supra note 28; Roberts, supra note 61.
See There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1.
Id.
GINA prohibits requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. GINA § 202(b). It
does not provide an exception for actuarial fairness.
For a pre-GINA discussion of rational versus irrational genetic discrimination, see Mark A.
Rothstein & Mary R. Anderlik, What Is Genetic Discrimination and How Can It Be Prevented?,
3 GENETICS MED. 354 (2001), which differentiates between social and actuarial definitions of
genetic discrimination.
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gage in positive differential treatment like affirmative action and accommodation. In the context of genetic information, Mark Rothstein has argued for the
importance of recognizing genetic difference.300 GINA itself acknowledges,
through its many exceptions, that employees can benefit from sharing their genetic data with employers for the purposes of wellness programs, occupational
monitoring, and family medical leave. Both authors of this Feature have separately touted the potential benefits of recognizing genetic variation in the workplace. We have each argued in favor of the voluntary disclosure of genetic information for the purposes of accommodation and genetic diversity.301 Too robust
of a privacy protection could, therefore, undermine the central goals of antidiscrimination legislation.
Worker surveillance more generally could also have meaningful benefits.
Employers could use sensitive information like social media and browser histories to ensure a safer, more productive workplace. Monitoring employees or
screening applicants could allow employers to identify toxic behavior, such as
racial animus or sexual harassment, early on. One potential justification for
worker surveillance in high-risk jobs is that it may save lives. Computers can
enlist visual scanning technology to ensure that workers are wearing the appropriate safety equipment before allowing them access to dangerous areas.302 Cameras on the factory floor can observe employees in order to quickly identify
risks.303 Invasions of employee privacy could, perhaps counterintuitively, improve the lives of workers.
While we acknowledge the validity of these critiques, we maintain that GINA
offers a useful foundation for future lawmaking. GINA outlaws even rational
discrimination. Nowhere is this clearer than in Title I, where GINA prohibits
health-insurer access to and use of even actuarially sound genetic information.304
The statute’s antidiscrimination mandate thus includes rational discrimination.305
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Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 817, 842-43 (1991).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2018) (noting the term “discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability” includes an unwillingness to make reasonable accommodations); see also id.
§ 12112(a) (prohibiting such discrimination).
308. See Areheart, supra note 271, at 1104-08 (“[L]aws do more than secure material rights and
deter certain behaviors. Rather, they reflect social values and send messages to the public
about both what society should value and how the relevant subject should be valued.”).
309. Cf. Alex C. Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Expressive Law and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1061 (2016) (exploring the expressive effects of the ADA).
310. Roberts, supra note 61, at 631-32.
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Of course, some might argue that when a decision maker bases her choice on
rational deliberation and accurate information, it is not in fact “discrimination”
at all. But antidiscrimination law rejects such a narrow definition of what it
means to discriminate. Statistical discrimination, where people make “rational
statistical inferences about average differences among . . . groups,” is illegal under most federal employment discrimination laws as intentional discrimination.306 Perhaps the best example of an antidiscrimination law that rejects rational discrimination is the ADA, which requires an employer to provide
reasonable accommodations at its own expense for qualified individuals with
disabilities.307 Further, hiring employees with disabilities may have accompanying costs, making it sometimes economically rational—but illegal—to screen out
applicants based on disability. Discrimination laws were never intended to maximize employer wealth or merely constrain employers to rational decision-making. Law has important social functions beyond securing rights or deterring certain behaviors.308 In this light, at least some of GINA’s value is expressive.309 It
communicates that basing decisions on even accurate genetic risk is socially unacceptable.
Permitting even rational genetic discrimination is socially problematic. To
begin, accurate genetic data merely conveys predictions, not certainties. Thus, a
person with high genetic risk may never develop the accompanying condition.
Allowing discrimination based on genetic data could penalize people for something that may never actually happen. But beyond efficiency concerns, widespread genetic discrimination could produce stigma and, by consequence, a genetic underclass.310 Forming a genetic underclass would violate several
important social norms and values, including humanity (by denying a person’s
inherent value), democracy (by creating largely arbitrary class distinctions), im-
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mutability (by punishing people for something outside their control), and privacy (by leading to the disclosure of intimate information).311 Safeguarding individuals from genetic discrimination and, in so doing, preventing a genetic underclass are important aims of the law.
As written, GINA strikes a reasonable balance between antidiscrimination
and efficiency. Through its exceptions, the statute acknowledges that some
amount of employer access to genetic information is appropriate when an employee consents to the disclosure and the subsequent use of the information offers the employee some kind of benefit. We might then add additional provisions
to the statute that would allow employees to voluntarily disclose their genetic
information for purposes of accommodation and diversity.312
Future laws based on GINA could also include these kinds of prudent exceptions. A law that prohibits requesting information about race, national origin,
religion, gender, or disability must permit employees to share that information
voluntarily for the purposes of diversity initiatives, accommodation requests,
and leave applications. With respect to workplace monitoring, any GINA-like
protection would require that employees consent, something already required
by the state and federal anti-eavesdropping laws described above.313 Voluntariness is essential to obtaining consent. Courts interpreting the law should scrutinize policies that make data gathering a condition of employment and other possibly coercive tactics. In short, lawmakers must carefully craft future employeeprivacy laws to strike the proper balance between secrecy and disclosure, and
GINA offers some—albeit imperfect—guidance. As well, courts should interpret
GINA and future privacy laws with these competing objectives in mind.
b. Traditional Antidiscrimination Classes
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Another possible criticism of adding GINA-like protections for previously
recognized antidiscrimination classes is that those categories are often not private to begin with. Privacy can only preempt discrimination for invisible attributes. Not only are protected classes like race, gender, and disability often visible,
but people interact with them in a way that gives them the weight to help define
one’s social reality.314 People may be uninterested in, or unable to keep secret,
statuses like race, gender, and disability.315 Yet GINA-like privacy protections
311.

Id. at 611-17.
See Areheart, supra note 28; Roberts, supra note 61.
313. See supra Section III.A.2.a.
314. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2143.
315. Id.
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may still have uses in antidiscrimination law, including for traditional antidiscrimination classes. People can be racially ambiguous, have hidden disabilities,
not look their age, or identify with a gender that does not correspond to the sex
denoted on their birth certificates.316 In each of these situations, allowing employees to maintain some measure of control over their personal information
could thwart subsequent discrimination. Furthermore, expanding protections
for traditional antidiscrimination classes could have expressive value by demonstrating respect with regard to how people construct their identities.
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c. Nature of Big Data
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Critics might also ask whether GINA-like protections would succeed where
ADA-like protections might fail, particularly with respect to big data. GINA is
superior to the ADA in preempting the disclosure of medical information in
three material respects. First, it bans all acquisitions of statutorily covered genetic information, including purchases from third parties, while the ADA contains no such prohibition. The ADA only stops employers from obtaining information that pertains to disability through medical examinations or disabilityrelated inquiries. Purchasing medical information from a third-party source may
violate the ADA’s spirit but not its face. Second, the ADA expressly allows employers to obtain information about disability after an offer is on the table. This
provision means that an employer could, postoffer, condition employment on
medical disclosures. GINA’s blanket prohibition on obtaining the protected information from any source at any point in the employment relationship makes
that law a better prototype for workplace privacy legislation.
Third, the ADA fails to offer adequate protection in a world of big data in
part because employers may no longer require medical examinations or disability-related inquires to learn what they want to know. If employers do not need
to rely on genetic data to get access to the information they desire, GINA’s protections could well suffer from the same deficiencies. Big-data analysis can take
seemingly innocuous information and use it to deduce highly intimate details
about a person’s life. In the Huntington’s example discussed above, GINA took
family medical history off the table, making it harder for the employer to deduce
why the employee was seeing a neurologist. In that context, GINA could effectively combat employer snooping. But imagine that an employer had no access
to health-related information at all. If Hitachi can use physical movement to
measure happiness and apps can use “word choice in text messages, the speed of

Id. at 2143-47.
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your speech, and [phone] usage patterns” to assess mental health,317 it seems
plausible that an employer could use those same technologies to detect neurological decline in its early stages, perhaps even before the individual secures a
diagnosis or learns of the condition. In such an example, genetic data is not at
stake, but the scenario raises the same kinds of concerns. Will big data simply
render GINA-like laws obsolete as well?
The solution here lies in creating broad protections for potentially sensitive
information. GINA’s narrow protected status—not its prohibition on requesting, requiring, or purchasing—is where the statute may fall short with respect to
big data. We therefore maintain that GINA’s privacy provisions, complete with
exceptions to strike the proper balance, offer meaningful guidance to lawmakers.
As suggested above, courts should interpret genetic information broadly and
legislators should consider amending the statute to expand its coverage. A move
away from antidiscrimination classes to protect sensitive information of all
stripes would be most beneficial to employees.

Patrick Staples & John Torous, Can Your Smartphone Read Your Mind?, SLATE (Sept. 20, 2017,
2:06
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/09/why_we
_should_be_cautious_about_mental_health_apps_that_collect_smartphone.html
[https://perma.cc/K89G-NRWS].
318. See Rothstein, supra note 30, at 177 (“Effective protection of genetic information in the employment setting requires a ban on employer requests for comprehensive records at the postoffer stage; the research, development, and adoption of health information technology to facilitate the disclosure of only job-related health information; and the legal requirement to
limit the scope of disclosures to job-related information.”).
319. Id. at 174-76.
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GINA in its current form might suffer from at least one practical limitation.
Rothstein points out that GINA’s privacy provisions are nearly impossible to respect. At present, technology lacks the capability to redact genetic information
quickly and efficiently from medical records. As a result, employers may inadvertently receive genetic information as part of postoffer, ADA-compliant disclosures.318 Inadvertent acquisition is, as explained above, not actionable. Thus,
Rothstein asserts that as long as the ADA allows the postoffer release of comprehensive medical records, GINA’s prohibition on obtaining genetic information
will have little practical value.319 This flaw is more of a shortcoming of technology than of the underlying law. One possible way to solve this issue is to subject
postoffer medical requests under the ADA to greater scrutiny. We will need to
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develop better software and other tools to allow custodians of health data to redact covered information simply and quickly.320 Prohibitions on requesting, requiring, or purchasing private information are still valuable, and having those
laws in place could encourage innovations that will eventually lead to better compliance.
C. Implications
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Having outlined GINA’s potential as a blueprint for future lawmaking, we
now take a deeper dive into the theoretical and practical implications of offering
GINA-like protections for employee privacy. One thing that made GINA a pathbreaking statute is its combination of a novel privacy protection with traditional
antidiscrimination protections in the spirit of Title VII and the ADA.321 We begin
with the relationship between antidiscrimination and privacy. We then demonstrate how GINA’s bimodal framework offers superior protections to previous
antidiscrimination statutes.
1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Privacy Harms

Companies already market products designed to help redact protected health information
from medical records. See, e.g., Automated Data Redaction Software, EXTRACT SYSTEMS (2018),
https://www.extractsystems.com/automated-data-redaction-software
[https://perma.cc
/Y3GF-5XMC].
321. See Roberts, supra note 28, at 2101.
322. Id. at 2113.
323. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at xiii (1995) (“Although
we live in a world of noisy self-confession, privacy allows us to keep certain facts to ourselves
if we so choose. The right to privacy, it seems, is what makes us civilized.”).
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Privacy and antidiscrimination are two separate but related areas of law.
GINA’s privacy protections serve two important goals. First, they protect employees from intrusions into their private lives. Second, they safeguard employees from discrimination. We can understand both objectives in privacy terms.
There are at least two kinds of privacy harms: intrinsic and extrinsic.322 Intrinsic privacy harms violate privacy as an independent moral value. Disclosure
creates intimacy. Privacy has independent moral value because it allows us to
define our relationships through what we keep secret and what we disclose.
Some scholars have even argued that having control over what is known about
the self is the very basis of civilized society.323 With respect to intrinsic privacy
harms, the detriment is the invasion itself, regardless of whether the intruder
actually acts on that information.
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Consider the devious defecator case. Rather than resulting in an adverse employment action, the privacy invasion actually exonerated the employees. Employment discrimination law is clear that being teased alone is not a harm that
provides a sufficient basis for recovery.324 What then was the harm in requiring
the plaintiffs to undergo genetic testing—a harm that jurors valued at $2.2 million dollars? The answer appears to be a transgression of the employees’ genetic
privacy. Big data threatens to exacerbate the potential for these kinds of intrusions, as employees may feel violated when their employers learn information
that the employees would have preferred to keep secret.325 Thus, one benefit of
GINA-like protections is to uphold privacy in the workplace as an important independent moral value.
Discrimination based on previously unknown information can be considered
an extrinsic privacy harm. Extrinsic privacy harms are the wrongs that flow from
invasions. Privacy has instrumental value: it allows us to make certain choices
free from the scrutiny of others. When a person uncovers a secret and acts on
that new information, an extrinsic privacy harm occurs. An example would be if
an employer uses big data to deduce that one of its employees is trying to get
pregnant and then chooses not to promote her based on that acquired
knowledge. Not only does she experience the independent harm associated with
the invasion (the intrinsic privacy harm), she also experiences a subsequent adverse employment action (the extrinsic privacy harm). However, if the employer
never learns she is pregnant, it cannot use that information to her detriment. In
certain cases, then, protecting privacy can prevent discrimination.
Traditionally, antidiscrimination laws prohibit employers from taking adverse employment actions on the basis of protected classes. Insofar as they protect privacy, they almost exclusively cover extrinsic privacy harms.326 In many
states, then, it is legal for employers to question their employees, even if those
inquiries could open the door for subsequent discrimination.327 An employer

See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (acknowledging that
antidiscrimination laws are not civility codes for the American workplace and observing that
such laws do not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment—just harassment that happens
pursuant to a protected class); Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“The idea behind requiring proof of an adverse employment action is simply that a statute
which forbids employment discrimination is not intended to reach every bigoted act or gesture that a worker might encounter in the workplace.”).
325. There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1 (“As more companies rely on outside firms to collect
and crunch employee information, privacy concerns will increase, and employees may feel
violated if they do not think they have given their consent to sharing their data.”).
326. Of course, the ADA’s medical inquiry provisions are one exception to this generalization.
327. See Jessica L. Roberts, Rethinking Employment Discrimination Harms, 91 IND. L.J. 393, 441
(2016) (explaining that only half of the states prohibit employers from asking about protected
status).
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might obtain information about an employee’s race, ethnicity, national origin,
religion, age, or gender and then act on that information, either consciously or
subconsciously. Absent meaningful privacy protections, employees could find
themselves victimized twice, once from the unwanted invasion and again from
the discriminatory act. GINA, however, safeguards against both kinds of privacy
violations. Any future employment protection based on GINA would likewise
have the benefit of simultaneously protecting privacy and preventing subsequent
discrimination, giving employees the ability to recover for both kinds of privacy
harms.
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2. Antisubordination
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Protecting people’s privacy in data would likewise prevent them from suffering adverse employment actions based on that data. Employment discrimination
claims are notoriously hard to prove,328 making it arguably easier to prevent an
employer from obtaining sensitive information than to prevent an employer
from acting upon it. Robust employee-privacy legislation could therefore have
the added benefit of reducing opportunities to discriminate.
Preventing employers from prying into their employees’ private lives could
have especially important implications for antisubordination. As discussed at
length, one area of interest to employers is health. Using big data to pry into
medical history could disparately impact several groups, including women trying to conceive, people with disabilities who have existing or past health conditions (including invisible disabilities), racial and ethnic groups that may be at
greater risk of certain diseases, and trans individuals who may be seeking or have
sought gender reassignment unbeknownst to their employers. As a society, we
may be more likely to label a group as “risky” if that group faces stigma.329 Robust employee-privacy laws could protect those people from potential discrimination. Moreover, a privacy-based approach bypasses some of the pitfalls of its
antidiscrimination cousin. By not relying on protected class, it avoids identity
politics in a time of especially inflammatory debate. It also avoids the problem
of protected class gatekeeping, which incorrectly focuses courts’ attention on
membership in the enumerated statutory class as opposed to dismantling socially pernicious biases.330

See generally Clermont & Schwab, supra note 288; Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001) (demonstrating that employment
discrimination cases are unusually difficult to win).
329. See Valarie K. Blake, Ensuring an Underclass: Stigma Theory Applied to Insurance 46 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
330. See Clarke, supra note 279, at 104-06.
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Congress passed GINA as a solution to a very specific problem: public anxiety surrounding medical genetic testing. While the statute’s limited scope, narrow protected status, and privacy provisions have led commentators to dismiss
the law as truncated, ineffective, and even unnecessary, GINA’s peculiarities
make sense when understood in light of its original purpose. However, at
GINA’s ten-year anniversary, it is unclear whether GINA has had any impact on
the public’s willingness to take genetic tests. Given this reality, it may be tempting to dismiss GINA as a failure.
At first blush, our original research in Part II may appear to confirm the view
that GINA has been a disappointment. However, a closer reading of the cases
from GINA’s first decade reveals that the statute has been an understated success. Despite being tangential to its central goal of preventing discrimination in
health insurance, its protections of employee privacy have been of serious, albeit
unexpected, value. Reflection on the first ten years of GINA leads to a surprising
but critical insight: what employees need most is not protection against discrimination based on genetic-test results, but rather safeguards against employer
prying more generally.
Privacy protections at work are more important now than ever. Through data
mining, employers have vast access to information about their employees’ private lives. In a world of big data, GINA offers a robust and unexpected safeguard
against snooping by employers. The law prevents employers from obtaining information about a protected status and regulates access to data that employers
could mine. GINA’s protections could then be a model to better protect privacy
on the job.
Technology could soon render other antidiscrimination statutes obsolete.
Existing laws like the PDA and the ADA do nothing to stop employers from using big data to learn about their employees’ reproductive lives and risks of disability. GINA’s value, by contrast, is appreciating. It has the potential to achieve
far more than what Congress intended. The law demonstrates an effective way
of structuring much-needed protections for employee privacy in light of the bigdata revolution. Far from being ineffective or useless, GINA may actually serve
as a model for the employment laws of the future.
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appendix: facts, claims, and bases for resolution in
federal cases with plausible gina claims
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By plausible, we mean only that the facts pled could conceivably support a
claim under GINA or the plaintiff at least attempted to make an argument about
how genetic discrimination was at issue. These orders pertain to forty-eight
unique cases; we selected the order for each case that was most pertinent to the
GINA claim.
Abbreviations for Employee’s Posture: Constructive Discharge (CD), Denied Reinstatement (DR), Failure to Hire (FH), Failure to Promote (FP), Harassment (H), Placed on Leave (PL), Demotion (D), Retaliation (Ret), and Termination (T). The employee’s posture for some cases was not available in the
opinions; for such cases, we obtained the information from the complaints on
the actual dockets.
Abbreviations for Factual Scenarios: Disability Accommodation (DA), Disclosure of Genetic Information (DGI), DNA Test (DNA), Drug Test (DT), Fitness-for-Duty Examination (FDE), Genetic Test (GT), HIV Test or Diagnosis
(HIV), Mandatory Wellness Program (MWP), Other Disclosure of Medical Information (ODMI), Other Disclosure of Family Medical History (ODFMH),
Request for Medical Exam or Records (RMER), Request for Family Medical
History (RFMH), Unemployment (UN), Voluntary Wellness Program (VWP),
and Workers Compensation (WC). The facts alleged for some cases were not
fully available in the opinions; for such cases, we obtained the alleged facts from
the complaints on the actual dockets.
Abbreviations for Claims: Disclosure of Genetic Information (DGI), Discrimination (Disc), Harassment (H), Retaliation (Ret), Unlawful Request
(UR), and UWP (Unlawful Wellness Program).
Abbreviations for Substantive Resolutions: Definition of Discriminate
(Disc), Definition of Employee (EE), Definition of Employer (ER), Definition
of Genetic Information (GI), Definition of Genetic Test (GT), Unlawful Request
(UR), and Definition of Wellness Programs (WP). Only thirty-one cases are
resolved, in whole or in part, under GINA’s statutory terms, and they are noted
in this column with an asterisk (*). The other seventeen cases involve a plausible
GINA claim that (a) was left fully unresolved (U) or (b) involved a procedural
resolution (PR).
Abbreviations for Party Prevailing: Defendant (Def), Plaintiff (Pl).
Under the heading for Substantive Resolution, we have indicated resolutions
that are only procedural as “PR.” For example, if the defendant sought to dismiss
the matter for purposes of arbitration, we have marked it as PR. If the matter is
still pending, and not at all resolved, we have notated these cases as UR. If the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss and that motion was denied as to the GINA
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claim, we have noted the decision as UR. In all types of resolutions, we have
sought to indicate the party prevailing on the GINA claim—even if the decision
is not resolved under GINA (i.e., substantive) or a complete resolution. Accordingly, under the heading Party Prevailing on GINA Claim, we have sought to
indicate which party has prevailed thus far. As such, some of these decisions are
interlocutory in nature. Finally, if neither party prevailed under a substantive
provision of GINA, we have marked those cases with a dagger symbol (†).
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